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Gun violence is an epidemic in the United States. One hundred 
Americans are killed with guns every day; hundreds more are injured.1 Mass 
shootings are a regular occurrence: since Sandy Hook, there have been nearly 
2500 mass shootings.2 This means that on average, there is nearly one mass 
shooting every day.3 What’s more, gun violence is a uniquely American 
problem. The United States leads the developed world in gun deaths, with the 
civilian gun death rate in the United States nearly four times greater than 
Switzerland’s, five times that of Canada, thirty-five times the U.K.’s, and fifty-
three times higher than Japan’s.4 The United States gun suicide rate is eight times 
greater and its gun homicide rate twenty-five times higher than that of other high-
 
1 Gun Violence in America, EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY (Feb. 20, 2020), https://every 
townresearch.org/gun-violence-america/#foot_note_13 [https://perma.cc/6K97- NMA3]. 
2 German Lopez & Kavya Sukumar, Mass Shootings Since Sandy Hook, in One Map, VOX, https 
://www.vox.com/a/mass-shootings-america-sandy-hook-gun-violence [https://perma.cc/ EW6Q-
A2VM] (last visited Apr. 25, 2020). According to the Gun Violence Archive, mass shootings 
are “events in which four or more people, excluding the shooter, were shot . . . at the same 
general time and location.” German Lopez, In the Year After Parkland, There Was Nearly 
One Mass Shooting a Day, VOX (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.vox.com/2019/2/14/ 18223613/ 
parkland-mass-shootings-gun-violence-map-charts-data [https://perma.cc/8F98-6THR]. 
3 Id.  
4 See Mohsen Naghavi, Global Mortality from Firearms, 1990–2016, 320 JAMA 792, 797–
806 (2018) (comparing the mortality rate per 100,000 people of all 195 countries).  





income countries.5 American women in particular are nearly sixteen times more 
likely to be killed with a gun than women in other high-income countries.6  
This epidemic has led several states to implement “proper cause” 
regulatory regimes, under which individuals may not carry firearms in public 
unless they have a valid statutory reason. Although self-defense is one such 
sanctioned reason for an unrestricted license to carry, applicants may not 
simply assert a general desire to protect themselves; rather, they must 
demonstrate a “special need” for self-defense in order to receive an 
unrestricted license to carry firearms in public. Hence, these regulations are 
called “special need,”7 “justifiable need,”8 “good cause,”9 “good reason to 
fear injury,”10 and “good and substantial reason”11 laws. 
 
5 Erin Grinshteyn & David Hemenway, Violent Death Rates: The US Compared with Other 
High-Income OECD Countries, 129 AM. J. MED. 266, 268–69 (2010). 
6 Id. at 270. 
7 In New York, to establish proper cause to obtain a license without any restrictions, an 
applicant must “demonstrate a special need for self-protection distinguishable from that of 
the general community or of persons engaged in the same profession.” Kachalsky v. Cty. of 
Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).  
8 Under New Jersey’s Handgun Permit Law, applicants must demonstrate a justifiable need in 
order to carry a handgun in public. Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 428 (3d Cir. 2013). “Justifiable 
need” means “the urgent necessity for self-protection, as evidenced by specific threats or 
previous attacks which demonstrate a special danger to the applicant's life that cannot be 
avoided by means other than by issuance of a permit to carry a handgun.” N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 
13:54–2.4(d)(1) (2020). 
9 Hawaii limited the open carry of firearms to those “engaged in the protection of life and 
property” and the concealed carry of firearms to those who can demonstrate an “exceptional 
case,” when an applicant shows reason to fear injury to the applicant’s person or property. Young 
v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2018), reh’g en banc granted, 915 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 
2019) (citing HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-9 (2019)).  
10 Massachusetts may issue a license to carry as long as “the applicant can demonstrate a ‘proper 
purpose’ for carrying a firearm,” which includes good reason to fear injury. Gould v. Morgan, 
907 F.3d 659, 663 (1st Cir. 2018) (citing Ruggiero v. Police Comm’r, 464 N.E.2d 104, 107 
(1984)). This “requir[es] that an applicant furnish some information to distinguish his own need 
for self-defense from that of the general public . . . . above and beyond a generalized desire to 
be safe.” Id. The District of Columbia limited licenses for the concealed carry of handguns (the 
only type of permissible carriage) to those showing a “good reason to fear injury to [their] person 
or property” or “any other proper reason for carrying a pistol.” Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 
864 F.3d 650, 655 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (citing D.C. CODE § 22-4506(a)–(b) (2015)). “To receive a 
license based on the first prong—a ‘good reason to fear injury’—applicants must show a ‘special 
need for self-protection distinguishable from the general community as supported by evidence 
of specific threats or previous attacks that demonstrate a special danger to the applicant's life.’” 
Id. (citing D.C. CODE § 7-2509.11(1)(A)). 
11 Maryland issues gun permits upon finding “the applicant has [a] good and substantial reason 
to wear, carry, or transport a handgun, such as a finding that the permit is necessary as a 
reasonable precaution against apprehended danger.” Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 869 
(4th Cir. 2013) (citing MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5–306(a)(5)(ii) (West 2020)). 





 Because current Supreme Court caselaw on the Second Amendment 
technically concerns the right to keep arms in the home,12 the lawfulness of “special 
need” laws—which restrict public carriage—is uncertain. Part I of this Comment 
reveals that circuit court holdings addressing the constitutionality of these 
regulations run the gamut. Utilizing a clear framework approved by the Supreme 
Court, circuit courts first determine whether “special need” laws and their ilk 
burden a Second Amendment right. If so, they select and apply the appropriate 
means–end scrutiny in determining whether or not these regulations pass 
constitutional muster. Through these straightforward steps, one circuit court has 
held that “special need” laws do not implicate the Second Amendment at all, given 
their “longstanding” history; three circuit courts have assumed for analytical 
purposes that the Second Amendment grants the right to carry firearms in public 
for self-defense, but have upheld the burden on this “noncore” right through 
application of intermediate scrutiny; another court has held outright that the 
Second Amendment has some application outside the home, but has 
nevertheless upheld the regulation under intermediate scrutiny; two circuits 
have found not only that “special need” laws burden the “core” Second 
Amendment right of self-defense, but that these regulations constitute total 
bans that are per se unconstitutional under any level of scrutiny. Despite the 
variety of conclusions on the constitutionality of “special need” laws by the 
circuit courts, however, no court, I argue, has thus far gotten it right.13  
I explain why that is in Parts II and III. The crux of this issue is 
whether the “core” of the Second Amendment protects the right to carry a 
firearm in public for the purpose of self-defense. Through textual, historical, 
doctrinal, structural, and prudential analyses, I show that it does. Yet the next 
step is not to unilaterally declare these discretionary permitting regimes as 
complete and unconstitutional prohibitions on the right to bear arms in public 
for self-defense, as I argue in Part III. Rather, strict scrutiny is the proper test 
to apply in evaluating the constitutionality of “special need” laws. Applying 
this test, I conclude that, while upon first glance “special need” regimes 
appear to fail strict scrutiny, creative analysis suggests these laws may in fact 
meet the narrow tailoring requirement.  
 
 
12 See infra Section I.A (discussing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)). 
13 Given the circuit split, it is only a matter of time before the Supreme Court answers this 
question. See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 883 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 
2018) (ruling that premises licensing, which limits handgun owners’ ability to remove 
handguns from their homes, does not violate the Second Amendment), cert. granted, 139 S. 
Ct. 939 (2019); see also Malpasso v. Pallozzi, 767 F. App’x 525 (4th Cir. 2019), petition for 
cert. filed, 2019 WL 4795673 (U.S. Sep. 26, 2019) (No. 19-423) (affirming dismissal of a 
Second Amendment challenge to Maryland’s requirement that those seeking handgun carry 
licenses have a good and substantial reason to carry). 





I. COURTS ARE DIVIDED AS TO WHETHER  
“SPECIAL NEED” LAWS ARE CONSTITUTIONAL 
 
A. Heller’s Application Outside the Home is Ambiguous  
 
The controlling Supreme Court case on the Second Amendment is 
District of Columbia v. Heller.14 At the time, a District of Columbia law 
prohibited handgun possession, including in the home.15 “It also require[d] 
that any lawful firearm in the home be disassembled or bound by a trigger 
lock at all times, rendering it inoperable.”16 Dick Heller, a D.C. police officer, 
was denied a license to keep a handgun in his home, and subsequently 
challenged the District’s regulation insofar as it prohibited the carrying of a 
firearm in the home without a license, and the trigger-lock requirement 
insofar as it prohibited the use of “functional firearms within the home.”17  
The key issue in Heller was whether the Second Amendment 
conferred an broad individual right to keep and bear arms, or whether that 
right was granted only in relation to militia service.18 To answer this question, 
Justice Scalia—writing for the majority—first undertook a thorough textual 
analysis followed by a lengthy historical review. Explaining that the Second 
Amendment could be broken down into its prefatory clause (“A well 
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State,”) and 
operative clause (“the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be 
infringed.”), the Court proceeded to analyze each.19 The original meaning of 
“bear,” the majority stated, was to “carry,” not necessarily in connection with 
militia service.20 Thus the operative clause “guarantee[d] the individual right 
to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.”21 But did that 
individual right to bear arms fit with the prefatory clause, given that it 
explicitly mentions a militia? Justice Scalia answered:       
 
14 Heller, 554 U.S. 570.  
15 Id. at 574–75. 
16 Id. at 628.  
17 Id. at 575–76.  
18 As the Court explained, 
The two sides in this case have set out very different interpretations of the 
[Second] Amendment. Petitioners . . . believe that it protects only the right 
to possess and carry a firearm in connection with militia service. 
Respondent argues that it protects an individual right to possess a firearm 
unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that arm for traditionally 
lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home.  
Id. at 577 (citations omitted). 
19 Id. at 577.  
20 Id. at 584. 
21 Id. at 592. 





It is . . . entirely sensible that the Second Amendment’s 
prefatory clause announces the purpose for which the right 
was codified: to prevent elimination of the militia. The 
prefatory clause does not suggest that preserving the militia 
was the only reason Americans valued the ancient right; most 
undoubtedly thought it even more important for self-defense 
and hunting. 22  
Thus, for the first time, the Court held firmly that the Constitution did indeed 
recognize a right of “law-abiding, responsible citizens” to keep and bear arms 
for lawful purposes, unconnected with participation in military service.23  
Having recognized this right, the Court proceeded to ask whether 
District of Columbia law impermissibly violated it. The handgun ban, the 
Court found, prohibited an entire class of firearms on which the American 
people rely for self-defense.24 And the requirement that any firearm in the 
home be rendered inoperable made it impossible for citizens to use their 
weapons for that “core lawful purpose of self-defense.”25 The fact that this 
ban and these requirements extended to the home, the Court reasoned, “where 
the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute,” meant that 
the law would fail constitutional muster under any level of scrutiny.26  
Although Heller made clear that the use of firearms in defense of 
hearth and home was protected by the core of the Second Amendment, the 
scope of the right to keep and bear arms outside the home was left in doubt. 
This confusion is compounded by the explicit assurance in Heller that “the 
right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited. . . . [It is] not a 
right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever 
and for whatever purpose.”27  
Nevertheless, both sides of the debate surrounding “special need” 
laws claim Heller for themselves. States with such regulations point to the 
Court’s observation that “the need for defense of self, family, and property is 
most acute” in the home.28 By characterizing the right to use firearms in self-
defense as most acute in the home, their argument goes, the Court “necessarily 
implied that that right is . . . less acute outside the home.”29 In other words, 
how can a weaker right constitute a core Second Amendment protection?  
 
22 Id. at 599 (emphasis added).  
23 Id. at 595, 635. 
24 Id. at 628. 
25 Id. at 630. 
26 Id. at 628–29. 
27 Id. at 626.  
28 Id. at 628 (emphasis added). 
29 Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 669 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Henderson, J., 
dissenting) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).  





On the other hand, “the fact that the need for self-defense is most 
pressing in the home doesn’t mean that self-defense at home is the only right 
at the Amendment’s core.”30 Rather, Heller only mentions the home because 
the law at issue required that firearms in the home be rendered inoperable at all 
times. In actuality, much of the opinion focused on the “core lawful purpose of 
self-defense,” agnostic of where that need arose.31  
In sum, “[w]hat we do not know is the scope of [the Second 
Amendment] right beyond the home and the standards for determining when 
and how the right can be regulated by a government.”32 “This vast ‘terra 
incognita’ has troubled courts since Heller was decided.”33 Given their murky 
guideposts, it is unsurprising that circuit courts have taken varying approaches 
to evaluating “special need” laws.34  
 
B. The Interstitial Analytical Framework Has Generated Varying Holdings 
 
Six cases have considered whether states may require an individual 
demonstrate a “special need” for self-defense to receive a license to carry a 
firearm in public.35 In the circuit courts, a two-step approach to this question 
has developed.36 First, courts determine whether the regulation at issue burdens 
conduct protected by the Second Amendment. If so, courts secondly select the 
proper standard of means–end scrutiny to use in evaluating that regulation.  
Yet, while this approach is described as a two-part test, the inquiry is 
in reality comprised of several interstitial steps. First, there is a threshold 
question: does a law requiring applicants demonstrate a valid need for self-
defense to receive a license to carry in public burden a Second Amendment 
right at all? Second, if yes, what is the extent of that burden? Third, with that 
 
30 E.g., Id. at 657.  
31 Heller, 554 U.S. at 630. 
32 Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 2012).  
33 Id. (citing United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011)). 
34 See generally Justine E. Johnson-Makuch, Statutory Restrictions on Concealed Carry: A 
Five-Circuit Shoot-Out, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2757 (2015) (analyzing federal circuit court 
decisions related to “challenges to statutory restrictions on concealed carry of handguns” 
post-Heller).  
35 Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044, 1053 (9th Cir. 2018), reh’g en banc granted, 915 F.3d 
681 (9th Cir. 2019); Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 668 (1st Cir. 2018); Wrenn v. District 
of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 657 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 869 
(4th Cir. 2013); Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 429 (3d Cir. 2013); Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 
89. Other circuit cases have considered similar questions but are not directly on all fours. 
See, e.g., Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 937 (7th Cir. 2012) (considering an Illinois law 
that completely banned the public carriage of firearms in public). 
36 See, e.g., Gould, 907 F.3d at 668–69 (citing numerous circuit court cases utilizing a two-
step approach). 





in mind, what is the appropriate means–end scrutiny to apply? And fourth, 
does the law survive application of that scrutiny? Using this “four-step” 
approach, there are numerous possible outcomes. Circuit courts have 
produced three major holdings. 
 
1. Holding 1: Requiring that Gun License Applicants Demonstrate 
“Good Reason to Fear Injury” in Order to Carry a Firearm in Public 
Does Not Implicate the Second Amendment Because Such 
Regulations Are “Longstanding” and Thus Presumptively Lawful 
Under Heller. Therefore, No Level of Scrutiny Need Be Applied.  
  
On one end of the spectrum, the threshold question of whether “proper 
purpose” laws burden the Second Amendment at all  is answered in the 
negative, immediately ending the constitutional inquiry. This route is based 
entirely on one sentence in Heller: 
[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on 
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by 
felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of 
firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government 
buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on 
the commercial sale of arms.37 
In a footnote, the Court clarified: “We identify these presumptively lawful 
regulatory measures only as examples; our list does not purport to be 
exhaustive.”38 
Several circuit courts since Heller have interpreted this language as 
carving out exceptions to the right to keep and bear arms, involving conduct 
beyond the reach of the Second Amendment entirely.39 This was the approach 
 
37 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008).  
38 Id. at 627 n.26; see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 786 (2010) (reiterating 
Heller’s note that that it “did not cast doubt on such longstanding regulatory measures”). 
39 See United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 91 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding “presumptively 
lawful” to mean a prohibition that regulates conduct “outside the scope of the Second 
Amendment,” a “better reading, based on the text and the structure of Heller,” than one that 
would require “lawful” regulations to satisfy every level of constitutional scrutiny); see also 
Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 659 (noting that in Heller, the Supreme Court held that “legal regulations 
of possession or carrying that are ‘longstanding’ . . . reflect limits to the . . . right protected 
by the [Second] Amendment.”); Drake, 724 F.3d at 431 (“[C]ertain longstanding regulations 
are ‘exceptions’ to the right to keep and bear arms, such that the conduct they regulate is not 
within the scope of the Second Amendment.”); United States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 600 (3d 
Cir. 2012) (“[T]he longstanding limitations mentioned by the Court in Heller are exceptions 
to the right to bear arms.”), overruled on other grounds by Binderup v. Att’y Gen., 836 F.3d 
336 (3d Cir. 2016); United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 172 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[T]he 
 





taken by the Third Circuit in Drake v. Filko,40 which considered the 
constitutionality of New Jersey’s “justifiable need” law.41 The requirement 
that applicants demonstrate such need, the court reasoned, constituted “a 
longstanding regulation that enjoys presumptive constitutionality under the 
teachings articulated in Heller,” and thus “regulates conduct falling outside 
the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee.”42  
In reaching this conclusion, the Third Circuit engaged in a simple 
comparative analysis. For a regulation to qualify as “longstanding,” the court 
asserted, did not require that it date back to the Founding.43 As the D.C. 
Circuit noted in Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), the Supreme Court 
“considered ‘prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons’ to be 
‘longstanding,’” but states did not enact those laws until the early twentieth 
century.44 Laws identical to New Jersey’s “justifiable need” requirement 
were “adopted in the same era that states began adopting the felon in 
possession statutes that Heller explicitly recognized as being presumptively 
lawful longstanding regulations.”45 Thus, if passage in the early twentieth 
century was enough to confer historical legitimacy on one firearm law 
 
Supreme Court's discussion in Heller of the categorical exceptions to the Second 
Amendment was not abstract and hypothetical; it was outcome-determinative.”); United 
States v. Rene E., 583 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 2009) (resting the conclusion that the ban of 
juvenile possession of handguns did not violate the Second Amendment’s right to bear arms 
“on the existence of a longstanding tradition of prohibiting juveniles from both receiving and 
possessing handguns,” obviating the need to subject the regulation to any form of scrutiny). 
40 Drake, 724 F.3d 426. 
41 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:54–2.4(d)(1) (2020) (defining “justifiable need” as the “urgent 
necessity for self-protection, as evidenced by specific threats or previous attacks, which 
demonstrate a special danger to the applicant's life that cannot be avoided by means other 
than by issuance of a permit to carry a handgun”). 
42 Drake, 724 F.3d at 434.  
43 Id. 
44 Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see also 
Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 700 F.3d 
185, 196–97, 203 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that a statute prohibiting the sale of handguns to 
buyers under twenty-one was consistent with the “longstanding tradition of age- and safety-
based restrictions” on access to weapons, which Congress did not adopt until 1968); 
Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 90 n.11 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting that the laws 
listed as “presumptively lawful” in Heller were not enacted until the early twentieth century 
(citations omitted)); United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 173 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The first 
federal statute disqualifying felons from possessing firearms was enacted in 1938.”); United 
States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[L]egal limits on the possession of 
firearms by the mentally ill . . . are of 20th Century vintage; § 922(g)(4), which forbids  
possession by a person ‘who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or . . . committed to 
a mental institution’, was not enacted until 1968.” (citations omitted)). 
45 Drake, 724 F.3d at 433 (citations omitted). 





(banning felony possession), then surely that presumptive legality held for 
others enacted during the same era (including “proper cause” requirements).46  
Taking a more general perspective, the Third Circuit noted, yields 
the same result. Although “special need” laws may only date back to the 
early twentieth century, there is a “longstanding tradition of regulating 
the public carrying of weapons for self-defense,” involving even older 
laws.47 In the mid to late nineteenth century, “most states enacted laws 
banning the carrying of concealed weapons, and some states went even 
further . . . banning concealable weapons (subject to certain exceptions) 
altogether whether carried openly or concealed.”48 Thus, broadening the 
category to regulations on public carriage generally, as opposed to 
“special need” regulations specifically, provides even further support for the 
assertion that such laws are sufficiently “longstanding” to confer presumptive 
legality. As such, the court upheld New Jersey’s “justifiable need” law.49  
It is worth reiterating that the Third Circuit’s conclusion was, in 
and of itself, dispositive of the law’s constitutionality; when the four-step 
framework is resolved at this threshold inquiry, there is no need to apply 
any level of scrutiny. In other words, finding that the “justifiable need” 
law regulates an area excepted by the Second Amendment means that the 
regulation does not burden the Second Amendment’s guarantees. At the 
risk of stating the obvious, without a burden on a constitutional right in 
the first place, there is no way to investigate the extent of that burden.  
 
2. Holding 2: Yes, Requiring that Gun License Applicants 
Demonstrate a “Special Need” in Order to Carry a Firearm in 
Public for Self-Defense Burdens the Second Amendment, but 
Such a Regulation Implicates a Right Outside Its Core. Therefore, 
Intermediate Scrutiny Is Appropriate.  
 
 Most circuit courts, however, do proceed to the next interstitial step, 
deciding whether the public carriage of firearms in self-defense is a core 
Second Amendment right. Some opinions assume for analytical purposes that 
“special need” laws burden a constitutional right, meaning that courts accept, 
without deciding, that the Second Amendment has some application outside 
 
46 Id. at 434. 
47 Id. at 433. 
48 Id. (citing Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 95–96) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
49 The Third Circuit could have concluded its analysis at this dispositive first step. See 
Drake, 724 F.3d at 430 (“[W]e need not move to the second step.”). It nevertheless chose 
to further bolster its holding “because of the important constitutional issues presented,” 
id., proceeding to the second and third interstitial steps. Supra notes 40–48 and 
accompanying text. 





the home for the purpose of self-defense.50 Another has held outright that the 
Second Amendment protects public carriage in some circumstances.51 Since 
“the appropriate level of scrutiny must turn on how closely a particular law 
or policy approaches the core of the Second Amendment right and how 
heavily it burdens that right,” courts in this category then proceed to ask 
whether the right to carry firearms outside the home in self-defense is a core 
Second Amendment right.52  
The First, Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits have held that it is not.53 
In Kachalsky v. County of Westchester,54 the Second Circuit considered the 
issue of whether New York could “limit handgun licenses to those 
demonstrating a special need for self-protection.”55 The “critical difference” 
between the “special need” requirement and the law struck down in Heller, the 
court reasoned, was that the former limited the ability to carry firearms in public, 
whereas the latter banned guns in the home.56 The law thus affected conduct that 
fell “outside the core Second Amendment protections identified in Heller.”57 
The Fourth Circuit considered an identical issue in Woollard v. 
Gallagher, determining whether Maryland’s regulation requiring that applicants 
demonstrate “good and substantial reason” in order to receive handgun permits 
violated the Second Amendment.58 The court “refrain[ed] from any assessment 
of whether Maryland’s [rule] implicate[d] Second Amendment protections,” but 
 
50 Drake, 724 F.3d at 435; Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 876 (4th Cir. 2013); 
Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 89.  
51 The First Circuit explained: 
[T]he Heller Court stated that prohibitions on carrying firearms in 
‘sensitive places’ are ‘presumptively lawful’—a pronouncement that 
would have been completely unnecessary if the Second Amendment right 
did not extend beyond the home at all. Reading these tea leaves, we view 
Heller as implying that the right to carry a firearm for self-defense 
guaranteed by the Second Amendment is not limited to the home. 
Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 670 (1st Cir. 2018) (citations omitted). 
52 Id. at 670–71.  
53 See id. at 671 (“We make explicit today . . . that the core Second Amendment right is 
limited to self-defense in the home.”); Drake, 724 F.3d at 431 (“We do, however, recognize 
that the Second Amendment's individual right to bear arms may have some application 
beyond the home.”); Woollard, 712 F.3d at 874 (interpreting the “core protection” in Heller 
as “the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home” 
(quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634–35 (2008)); Kachalsky, 701 F.3d 
at 94 (“The proper cause requirement falls outside the core Second Amendment protections 
identified in Heller.”).  
54 Kachalsky, 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012). 
55 Id. at 91.  
56 Id. at 94. 
57 Id. 
58 Woollard, 712 F.3d at 869 (citing MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-306(a)(5)(ii) (2020)).  





stuck to the narrow view that the “core protection” described in Heller was only 
“the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth 
and home.”59 Thus, to the extent that an outside-the-home regulation burdened 
the Second Amendment at all, it restricted a noncore protection. 
In Drake, after the Third Circuit found New Jersey’s “justifiable need” 
regulation constituted a longstanding exception to the Second Amendment’s 
protection,60 it nevertheless proceeded to the next interstitial step, given the 
“critical importance” of the  constitutional matters.61 Like the Second and Fourth 
Circuits, the court found that if “the Second Amendment protects the right to 
carry a handgun outside the home for self-defense at all, that right is not part of 
the core of the Amendment.”62  
The First Circuit was the most recent court to consider a “special need” 
licensing scheme in Gould v. Morgan.63 Unlike the Second, Third, and Fourth 
Circuits, the First Circuit held that the “right to carry a firearm for self-defense 
guaranteed by the Second Amendment is not limited to the home.”64 
Nevertheless, the court made “explicit . . .  that the core Second Amendment 
right is limited to self-defense in the home.”65  
Each one of these circuit courts, after finding that public carriage for self-
defense is, at most, a noncore Second Amendment right, proceeded to hold in 
the third interstitial step that intermediate scrutiny was the proper means–end test 
to evaluate the constitutionality of “special need” laws.  
By way of background, courts arriving at the third interstitial step 
select the appropriate means–end scrutiny review from three options: rational 
basis, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny. Rational basis review entails 
a presumption that the regulation at issue is lawful and asks simply whether 
the statute bears a rational link to a legitimate public interest.66 But the Heller 
Court ruled out rational basis review in Second Amendment cases because it 
“would be redundant with the separate constitutional prohibitions on 
irrational laws.”67 That leaves intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny as the 
available tests. Intermediate scrutiny necessitates a substantial relationship 
between the regulation at issue and an important governmental interest, 
whereas strict scrutiny demands that a law be narrowly tailored to achieve a 
 
59 Id. at 874, 876 (citation omitted).  
60 Supra notes 40–48 and accompanying text. 
61 Drake, 724 F.3d at 434–35.  
62 Id. at 436 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
63 Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659 (1st Cir. 2018). 
64 Id. at 670. 
65 Id. at 671 (emphasis added).  
66 See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (defining 
rational basis review). 
67 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n.27 (2008). 





compelling public interest.68 In choosing between the two tests, the First 
Circuit explained in Gould: 
[T]he appropriate level of scrutiny must turn on how closely a 
particular law or policy approaches the core of the Second 
Amendment right and how heavily it burdens that right. A law 
or policy that burdens conduct falling within the core of the 
Second Amendment requires a correspondingly strict level of 
scrutiny, whereas a law or policy that burdens conduct falling 
outside the core of the Second Amendment logically requires 
a less demanding level of scrutiny.69 
In other words, the level of heightened scrutiny to apply turns on whether the 
law at issue impinges on the core of the Second Amendment’s protections:70 
If it does, strict scrutiny is warranted; if it does not, intermediate scrutiny is 
appropriate. Since the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits all found the 
public carriage of firearms in self-defense to constitute a noncore right, all 
four courts elected to apply intermediate scrutiny.71 
In the final step of the four-part framework, each of these circuit 
courts found that the “special need” laws survived application of intermediate 
scrutiny. The asserted governmental interest of protecting public safety and 
preventing crime (particularly violent crime committed with handguns), the 
courts concluded, is indisputably important.72 The bulk of the application in 
 
68 See, e.g., Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 734 (2011) 
(citing Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010)) (defining strict 
scrutiny); Gould, 907 F.3d at 674 (defining intermediate scrutiny).  
69 Gould, 907 F.3d at 670–71 (citations omitted). 
70 Analogizing to First Amendment jurisprudence provides further support for the key core 
versus noncore distinction in selecting between strict and intermediate scrutiny, respectively. 
Just as policies regulating speech outside the core protections of the First Amendment are 
subject to intermediate, not strict, scrutiny, so too must intermediate scrutiny be triggered for 
those firearm regulations implicating rights outside the core of the Second Amendment. 
Compare United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (applying 
strict scrutiny to content-based restrictions on noncommercial speech), with Fla. Bar v. Went 
For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995) (applying intermediate scrutiny to regulations on 
commercial speech).  
71 Gould, 907 F.3d at 672; Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 435 (3d Cir. 2013); Woollard v. 
Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 876 (4th Cir. 2013); Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 
81, 96 (2d Cir. 2012). 
72 See Gould, 907 F.3d at 673 (“It cannot be gainsaid that Massachusetts has compelling 
governmental interests in both public safety and crime prevention.”); Drake, 724 F.3d at 437 
(“The State of New Jersey has, undoubtedly, a significant, substantial and important interest 
in protecting its citizens’ safety.”); Woollard, 712 F.3d at 877 (“Appellees concede that ‘a 
compelling government interest in public safety’ generally exists . . . .”); Kachalsky, 701 
F.3d at 97 (“As the parties agree, New York has substantial, indeed compelling, 
governmental interests in public safety and crime prevention.”).  





these opinions thus focused on the “fit” piece of the inquiry, analyzing 
whether the limitation on the public carriage of firearms to those with a 
demonstrable need for self-defense substantially furthers the objective of 
safety. Emphasizing that the connection need only be “reasonable” and 
deferring to the judgment of state legislatures, the circuit courts found that 
the relationship was adequately substantial.73 Thus, all four “special need” 
firearm policies passed constitutional muster.  
 
3. Holding 3: Yes, Requiring that Gun License Applicants 
Demonstrate a “Special Need” in Order to Carry a Firearm in 
Public for Self-Defense Implicates the Core of the Second 
Amendment, Constituting in Effect a Total Ban on Firearm 
Ownership, Which Is Categorically Unconstitutional. 
 
Like the previous group of opinions, the third and final resolution on 
the constitutionality of “special need” laws reaches the second and third 
interstitial steps of the framework. But in this category, courts have instead 
held that the right to carry a firearm in public for the purpose of self-defense 
does constitute a core Second Amendment protection. Rather than apply 
strict scrutiny, however, the D.C. and Ninth Circuits have characterized the 
“special need” regulations as total bans on gun ownership, declaring them 
per se unconstitutional.  
In Wrenn v. District of Columbia,74 the D.C. Circuit considered a law 
confining the public carriage of handguns to those with a “special need” for 
self-defense. The court found that the core of the Second Amendment 
protects the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense—regardless of where 
that need arises.75 Recognizing that it was alone in this holding, the opinion 
criticized other circuits for failing to engage in the sufficiently rigorous 
historical analysis required by Heller.76 Despite this encroachment on a core 
Second Amendment right, however, the court declined to apply strict 
 
73 See Gould, 907 F.3d at 674 (“[T]he fit between the asserted governmental interests and the 
means chosen to advance them is close enough to pass intermediate scrutiny.”); Drake, 724 
F.3d at 439 (“As to the requirement that the ‘justifiable need’ standard not burden more 
conduct than is reasonably necessary, we agree with the District Court that the standard meets 
this requirement.”); Woollard, 712 F.3d at 880 (“[T]here is a reasonable fit between the good-
and-substantial-reason requirement and Maryland's objectives of protecting public safety and 
preventing crime.”);  Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 100 (granting deference to New York’s 
determination that “limiting handgun possession to persons who have an articulable basis for 
believing they will need the weapon for self-defense is in the best interest of public safety”). 
74 Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 664–67 (D.C. Cir. 2017).  
75 Id. at 661.  
76 Id.  





scrutiny.77 Rather, because the regulation permitted only a small minority of 
applicants to carry firearms in public for self-defense, the “special need” 
requirement was akin to a total ban for the average, law-abiding citizen.78 
Analogizing D.C.’s regulation to the “complete prohibition[]” struck down in 
Heller, the D.C. Circuit held that such total bans were “always invalid.”79 
Similarly, in Young v. Hawaii, the Ninth Circuit evaluated the 
constitutionality of a Hawaii statute limiting open carry of firearms to those 
“engaged in the protection of life and property.”80 It is worth noting that this 
case differs slightly from others that have considered “special need” laws 
because of the emphasis placed by the Ninth Circuit on open versus concealed 
carry.81 Nevertheless, the court’s holding that Heller recognized a core 
Second Amendment right of self-defense—both inside and outside the 
home—is relevant. Like the D.C. Circuit, the Ninth Circuit noted that “[a] 
law that imposes such a severe restriction on [a] core right [of the 
Amendment] that it ‘amounts to a destruction of the . . . right,’ is 
unconstitutional under any level of scrutiny.”82 Finding that Hawaii’s 
“special need” law restricted “open carry to a small and insulated subset of 
law-abiding citizens,” it thus constituted, in effect, a total destruction of a 
core right, automatically violating the Second Amendment.83  
 
C. Despite Six Cases, No Circuit Court Has Gotten It Right 
 
Each one of these three approaches taken by six Circuit courts is 
vulnerable to criticism.  
First, the contention that “special need” laws do not burden the 
Second Amendment at all, while perhaps logically convincing, is intuitively 
mistaken. A cursory glance at the text supports this intuition. How can a law 
 
77 Id. at 665–67. 
78 Id. at 667. 
79 Id. at 665 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629 (2008)). 
80 Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2018), reh’g en banc granted, 915 F.3d 
681 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-9 (2019)). 
81 In a prior decision, Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego (Peruta II), 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(en banc), the Ninth Circuit held that “the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms 
does not include, in any degree, the right of a member of the general public to carry concealed 
firearms in public.” Id. at 939. But the court explicitly left unresolved the question of whether 
the Second Amendment encompasses a right to open carry. See id. (“There may or may not 
be a Second Amendment right for a member of the general public to carry a firearm openly 
in public. The Supreme Court has not answered that question, and we do not answer it here.” 
(emphasis added)).  
82 Young, 896 F.3d at 1068 (quoting Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 
961 (9th Cir. 2014)).  
83 Id. at 1071. 





limiting who may carry a gun in public constitute an “exception” to the 
Second Amendment, which makes explicit the right to bear arms? Even 
accepting the argument that conduct outside the home is appropriately 
subject to stronger state regulation, to assert that the public domain is 
entirely beyond the reach of the Second Amendment’s guarantees seems, 
prima facie, a bridge too far.84  
Perhaps the Third Circuit’s conclusion would be less dubious if its 
comparative analysis were more airtight. The court’s juxtaposition of the 
enactment dates of laws deemed by Heller as “longstanding” with the 
enactment dates of “special need” regulations is an admittedly enticing 
oversimplification. It is true that states did not begin enacting prohibitions on 
firearm possession by felons—described in Heller as a “longstanding” rule—
until the early twentieth century. But these prohibitions had “historical 
pedigrees that originated with the founding generation.”85 Indeed, “[d]ebates 
from the Pennsylvania, Massachusetts and New Hampshire ratifying 
conventions, which were considered ‘highly influential’ by the Supreme 
Court in Heller, also confirm that the common law right to keep and bear 
arms did not extend to those who were likely to commit violent offenses.”86 
Although “a precise founding-era analogue,”87 may not be strictly necessary88 
to label a firearm regulation as longstanding, “Heller requires, at a minimum, 
that a regulation be rooted in history.”89 This historical foundation is missing 
from the Drake majority’s contention that “special need” laws are longstanding.  
The court’s invocation of concealed carry bans to support its assertion 
that the regulation of public carriage generally is a “longstanding tradition,” 
is also flawed. For one, laws that banned the carriage of concealed firearms 
 
84 See Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 447 (3d Cir. 2013) (Hardiman, J., dissenting) (“Our 
hesitance to recognize additional exceptions is unsurprising in light of the fact that by doing 
so we are determining that a certain regulation is completely outside the reach of the Second 
Amendment, not merely that the regulation is a permissible burden on the Second 
Amendment right.”). 
85 Id. at 450. 
86 United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 173 (3d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted) (quoting 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 604 (2008)); see also United States v. Skoien, 
614 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Many of the states [in the eighteenth century], whose 
own constitutions entitled their citizens to be armed, did not extend this right to persons 
convicted of crime.”). 
87 Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 700 F.3d 
185, 196 (5th Cir. 2012). 
88 See Adam Winkler, The Secret History of Guns, ATLANTIC, (Sept. 2011), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/09/the-secret-history-of-guns/308608/ 
[https://perma.cc/8U9H-WJTZ] (noting that the Founders “had no laws resembling Scalia’s 
list of Second Amendment exceptions”).  
89 Drake, 724 F.3d at 450 (Hardiman, J., dissenting). 





“have little bearing on laws that now regulate both concealed and open 
carry,”90 as do “special need” laws. What’s more, this kind of “long-
standingness analysis is conducted at too high a level of generality.”91 The 
reference category is not “special need” laws, the regulations at issue, but 
rather laws regulating public carriage generally. But this is “akin to saying 
that because the government traditionally could prohibit defamation, it can 
also prohibit speech criticizing government officials.”92 Such a broad inquiry 
has no support in constitutional law. For instance, when evaluating whether 
a law is sufficiently longstanding in First Amendment cases, the Supreme 
Court has looked to that particular type of regulation, not to a broader general 
category.93 Proving that there has been a “longstanding tradition of 
regulating the public carrying of weapons for self-defense,”94 in reality 
sheds no light on whether “special need” laws in particular are sufficiently 
longstanding to confer presumptive legality.  
Plus, Heller simply established a presumption that longstanding 
regulations were lawful. A presumption is, by definition, rebuttable. The Heller 
Court therefore “did not invite courts onto an analytical off-ramp to avoid 
constitutional analysis.”95 The Third Circuit, in simply juxtaposing “special 
need” requirements with felony possession laws and observing that some of 
these laws were enacted in the same era, hastily took this forbidden off-ramp.  
In actuality, the “presumptively lawful” passage in Heller, like the 
rest of the opinion, is ambiguous. It “does not suggest that a presumption 
of constitutionality attaches to the [listed] exceptions. An equally valid, if 
not better, reading of the language is that the Court presumed that it would 
find the Heller exceptions constitutional after applying some analytic 
 
90 Id. at 451; see also infra notes 211–15 and accompanying text (explaining the “ample 
alternative channels” theory).  
91 Drake, 724 F.3d at 451 (Hardiman, J., dissenting). 
92 Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
93 See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 795 (2011) (considering a First 
Amendment challenge to a ban on the sale of violent video games: “California’s argument 
would fare better if there were a longstanding tradition in this country of specially restricting 
children’s access to depictions of violence, but there is none”); United States v. Stevens, 559 
U.S. 460, 469 (2010) (considering a First Amendment challenge to a ban on depictions of 
animal cruelty: “the prohibition of animal cruelty itself has a long history in American law, 
starting with the early settlement of the Colonies. But we are unaware of any similar tradition 
excluding depictions of animal cruelty from ‘the freedom of speech’ codified in the First 
Amendment . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
94 Drake, 724 F.3d at 433. 
95 Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 686 (6th Cir. 2016). 





framework.”96 What that framework looks like, however, and which tier of 
scrutiny it demands, were left up in the air.   
 Not only is the framework for evaluating Heller’s “longstanding 
exceptions” unclear, but “the approach for identifying . . . additional 
restrictions is also unsettled.”97 While the exceptions listed in Heller were 
not purported to be exhaustive, “prudence [nevertheless] counsels caution 
when extending these recognized exceptions to novel regulations” not 
explicitly mentioned in the opinion.98 To carve out entirely from the 
Second Amendment’s guarantee an area as vast as the right to bear arms in 
public for self-defense—when no court has “excepted” this exercise 
before—is therefore an overreach.  
Second, the hasty decisions by the First, Second, Third, and Fourth 
Circuits that the Second Amendment’s core protections exclude public 
carriage are likewise faulty. The D.C. Circuit aptly criticized these courts 
for abandoning the “historical digging” that would have revealed their 
inferences as faulty.99 While the bulk of this Comment is devoted to 
rigorous constitutional analysis to determine whether the Second 
Amendment’s core protects the right to carry firearms outside the home 
for the purpose of self-defense, these circuit courts spill little ink on the 
issue. The First and Third Circuits provide hardly any historical 
reasoning.100 The Second and Fourth Circuits provide little more support, 
maintaining simply that “outside the home, firearm rights have always 
been more limited,” and “our tradition so clearly indicates a substantial 
role for state regulation of the carrying of firearms in public.”101 Perhaps 
recognizing its vulnerability to the criticism lobbed in Wrenn, the Second 
Circuit chalks up this gap to alleged historical inconsistencies, 
pronouncing simply that “[h]istory and tradition do not speak with one 
voice here. What history demonstrates is that states often disagreed as to 
the scope of the right to bear arms . . . .”102 Such cursory treatment of 
 
96 Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff's Dep’t, 775 F.3d 308, 324 (6th Cir. 2014), reh’g en banc 
granted, vacated (Apr. 21, 2015), reh’g en banc, 837 F.3d 678 (6th Cir. 2016). 
97 United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 93 (3d Cir. 2010) (emphasis added). 
98 Id.; see also United States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 602 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[W]e must tread 
carefully when deciding whether to find conduct not explicitly identified by the Heller Court 
as subject to ‘presumptively lawful’ restrictions as unprotected by the Second Amendment.”). 
99 Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2017).  
100 Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 671–73 (1st Cir. 2018); Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 
436 (3d Cir. 2013).  
101 Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 94 (2d Cir. 2012)  (quoting United States 
v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 470 (4th Cir. 2011)); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 
876 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 470). 
102 Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 91.  





history and momentary attention to original meaning is especially 
damning in light of Heller’s emphasis on these canons.103  
Yet the D.C. Circuit is not off the hook, either. Although Wrenn was 
much more rigorous in its historical analysis, its holding that the District’s 
“special need” law constitutes a total ban falls prey to the same kind of 
commonsense criticism levied against the Third Circuit’s “presumptively 
lawful” conclusion. Wrenn cited to Heller for the rule that “total bans are 
always invalid”;104 but Heller, unlike Wrenn, unequivocally involved a true 
and complete ban on handguns.105  
By design, “special need” laws and their ilk do not wholly prohibit, 
but rather explicitly authorize, the public carriage of firearms. To be sure, 
applicants who fail to demonstrate “good reason to fear injury” may not 
receive licenses to carry a gun in public whenever they would like to do so. 
But the fact that some people are permitted to carry guns in public for self-
defense, while others are prohibited from doing so, proves only that “special 
need” laws are discretionary, and thus inherently distinctive from total bans. 
Stated plainly, a policy that gives certain people X while withholding X from 
others cannot, by definition, be characterized as a total ban on X.  
Recognizing this obvious difference, the D.C. Circuit attempted to 
recast the ban struck down in Heller as somewhat discretionary too, noting the 
“minor exceptions” the law made for certain owners.106 But the exceptions in 
Heller were just that: exceptions to the rule, with the rule being a complete 
prohibition. That is an entirely different animal than the discretionary licensing 
promulgated under “special need” laws. Under “special need” laws, all 
licensees may keep and bear arms in the home, a significant portion of 
applicants are authorized to carry firearms in public for self-defense, and even 
more are permitted to use guns for hunting, target practice, sport, or transport.107  
 
103 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008) (“We look to [the historical 
background of the Second Amendment] because it has always been widely understood that the 
Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth Amendments, codified a pre-existing right.”).  
104 Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 664.  
105 Compare Heller, 554 U.S. at 574–75 (“The District of Columbia generally prohibits the 
possession of handguns. It is a crime to carry an unregistered firearm, and the registration of 
handguns is prohibited.”), with Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 655 (“[R]egulations limit[] licenses for 
the concealed carry of handguns . . . to those showing a good reason to fear injury to [their] 
person or property’ or ‘any other proper reason for carrying a pistol.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  
106 See id. (“Of course, the good-reason law isn’t a ‘total ban’ for the D.C. population as a 
whole of the right to bear common arms under common circumstances.”).  
107 See, e.g., Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 664 (1st Cir. 2018) (noting that, under 
Massachusetts’ “special need” regulation, 35–40% of all licenses in the relevant cities are 
issued without restrictions).  





In fact, the D.C. Circuit’s attempt to equate the District’s earlier 
complete prohibition on handguns with its newer discretionary “special need” 
licensing regime threatens to swallow the rule against total bans. By that logic, 
any law that prohibits some (but not all) citizens from exercising their core 
Second Amendment right is categorically unconstitutional. Yet that categorical 
approach flies in the face of the two-step approach adopted by nearly every 
circuit court after Heller,  which would “ask first whether a particular provision” 
burdens a Second Amendment right and then, “if it does, . . . go on to determine 
whether the provision passes muster under the appropriate level of 
constitutional scrutiny.”108  
The D.C. Circuit put forth one final, clever argument in response to 
these reasonable critiques. Even if the District’s “good reason” law differed 
from the complete prohibition on handguns struck down in Heller,109 the court 
reasoned, it should nevertheless be considered a total ban from the vantage point 
of ordinary, law-abiding, responsible citizens.110 In other words, the District’s 
“good reason” law, by requiring that applicants demonstrate a “‘special need 
for self-protection distinguishable from the general community,’” necessarily 
and completely barred, by design, any “ordinary” citizens (i.e. those lacking 
extraordinary need) from carrying firearms in public.111  
But from where exactly the D.C. Circuit devised this vantage point is 
unclear. While it is true that Heller emphasized the right of “law-abiding, 
responsible citizens,”112 it did not specify that these citizens be “ordinarily 
situated” or “commonly situated.” The Court’s repeated reference to firearm 
possession by “law-abiding, responsible citizens” should not be read to require 
some sort of “average joe” benchmark, but simply to distinguish between the 
gun rights of competent, innocent individuals versus, for example, felons and the 
mentally ill. Contrary to the D.C. Circuit’s contention, the Heller Court made 
clear that its reasoning did not “suggest the invalidity of laws” that “do not 
remotely burden the right of self-defense as much as an absolute ban on 
handguns.”113 Thus, there is a lack of support for the D.C. Circuit’s choice to 
limit the pool to average citizens—without any particular need for self-
 
108 Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 
2011) (emphasis added); see also, e.g., Powell v. Tompkins, 783 F.3d 332, 347 n.9 (1st Cir. 
2015) (recognizing that several circuits have adopted a two-step test and collecting cases).  
109  See Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 665 (“Of course, the good-reason law isn’t a ‘total ban’ for the D.C. 
population as a whole of the right to bear common arms under common circumstances.”).  
110 Id. at 666 (“[I]f Heller I dictates a certain treatment of ‘total bans’ on Second Amendment 
rights, that treatment must apply to total bans on carrying (or possession) by ordinarily 
situated individuals covered by the Amendment.”).  
111 Id. at 655 (citing D.C. CODE § 7-2509.11(1)(A) (2015)). 
112 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). 
113 Id. at 632.  





defense—when determining whether a “good reason” law constitutes a total ban; 
its radical reading of the Second Amendment to equate discretionary licensing 
policies with total bans is likewise unfounded.  
Even Young did not go as far as Wrenn. Rather, the Ninth Circuit’s 
characterization of the “exceptional case” law in Young as a total ban was 
actually valid, considering that Hawaii’s firearms regulations “created a regime 
under which not a single unrestricted license for public carriage had ever been 
issued.”114 In fact, the Ninth Circuit took pains to distinguish the Hawaii law 
from other states’ “special need” regulations under which the “good cause” 
standard “did not disguise an effective ban on the public carry of firearms.”115 
For this reason, Young is an outlier among cases to consider “special need” laws; 
it is most instructive for its extensive textual and historical analysis of the Second 
Amendment’s core protections.  
 
II. DOES THE SECOND AMENDMENT’S “CORE” PROTECT THE PUBLIC 
CARRIAGE OF GUNS FOR SELF-DEFENSE? 
 
As the overview of judicial precedent on “special need” laws 
demonstrates, a key inquiry in the four-step interstitial framework is whether 
the right to carry firearms in public constitutes the core of the Second 
Amendment.116 As the controlling precedent, “Heller and McDonald set 
the goalposts for our inquiry, which require determining the scope of the 
Second Amendment with respect to public carry.”117 Undertaking a textual, 
 
114 See Gould v. Morgan 907 F.3d 659, 674 (1st Cir. 2018) (discussing Young v. Hawaii, 896 
F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2018)). It is worth noting that numbers matter here. Hawaii’s regulatory 
regime operated as a total ban because it completely prohibited public carriage by failing to 
issue a single unrestricted license. Thus, there are cases in which “special need” laws can 
and should be struck down as unconstitutional under any level of scrutiny. Wrenn, 
considering the District of Columbia’s “good reason” law, was not such a case. In the context 
of Wrenn and its companion case Grace, the District had issued 61 unrestricted licenses in 
the nearly three months since the “good reason to fear injury” rule was promulgated by the 
Chief of Police. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees at 7, Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 
650 ,124 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (No. 16-7067).  
115 Young, 896 F.3d at 1072. 
116 Commentators have interpreted Heller as taking “a categorical approach in which ‘core’ 
Second Amendment interests receive something close to absolute protection, while more 
penumbral interests are subject to greater regulation.” Lawrence Rosenthal & Joyce Lee 
Malcolm, McDonald v. Chicago: Which Standard of Scrutiny Should Apply to Gun Control 
Laws?, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 437, 444 (2011).  
117 Young, 896 F.3d at 1051.  





historical, doctrinal, structural, and prudential analysis,118 I argue that the 
right to keep and bear arms in self-defense—irrespective of location—is at 
the core of the Second Amendment, completing the first two steps of the 
interstitial framework.  
Our lodestars in this analysis are “text and history,”119 since “they 
bear most strongly on what the right was understood to mean, at the time of 
enactment, to the public.”120 Thus, this Section begins with a textual and 
historical evaluation of the Second Amendment. Both of these canons of 
constitutional construction show that public carriage in self-defense is a core 
Second Amendment right. The plain meaning of the phrase “bear arms”—to 
carry for the purpose of defending oneself—compels this conclusion. 
Likewise, the rigorous historical analysis required by Heller demonstrates that 
the Framers understood the Second Amendment to codify their pre-existing 
right to carry firearms in self-defense.   
 This Section next considers less weighty, yet nonetheless important, 
modalities: judicial precedent, structural arguments, and prudential 
considerations. Although Heller and McDonald do not directly address the 
public carriage of firearms in self-defense, both opinions make clear that self-
defense is at the core of the Second Amendment. The rest of this Section 
considers, and ultimately rejects, the structural and prudential considerations 
which assert that public carriage, even in self-defense, is at most a noncore 
Second Amendment right.  
 
A. Textual Analysis 
 
 As Judge O’Scannlain of the Ninth Circuit stated in Young: “We start, 
as we must, with the text.”121 The Second Amendment provides: “A well 
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of 
the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”122 This language, 
particularly the right not just to “keep” but also to “bear” arms, must be read 
to recognize a right to carry a firearm in public. As the Supreme Court 
explained in Heller, “[a]t the time of the founding, as now, to ‘bear’ meant to 
 
118 See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 
(1982) (identifying six methods, or “modalities,” of constitutional interpretation: historical, 
textual, doctrinal, prudential, structural, and ethical). Ethical analysis, including, for 
example, considerations of national ethos, are not included in this Comment.  
119 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008).  
120 Young, 896 F.3d at 1051.  
121 Id. at 1052. 
122 U.S. CONST. amend. II. 





‘carry.’”123 With this plain meaning in mind, the right to bear arms in the 
Second Amendment quite obviously implies a right to carry firearms in 
public. For “[t]o speak of ‘bearing’ arms within one’s home,” as Judge Posner 
commonsensically reasoned, “would . . . have been an awkward usage.”124 
Put more directly, the Second Amendment does not only protect the right to 
carry arms “from the bedroom to the living room.”125  
 Even without the Supreme Court’s use of dictionary definitions to 
indicate that “bear” means “carry,” this construal of the Second 
Amendment’s language is supported by historical accounts. Heller’s “review 
of founding-era sources,” proves this “natural meaning.”126 State 
constitutional provisions from the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, 
the Court reasoned, codified the right of individuals to “‘bear arms in defense 
of themselves and the state’” or “‘bear arms in defense of himself and the 
state.’”127 The phrase “bear arms,” therefore, referred to carrying firearms 
generally, not only by militia members, but by individuals outside of 
military service as well.128  
 
123 Heller, 554 U.S. at 584 (citing THOMAS SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1796); NOAH WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE  (1828) (reprinted 1989); 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, JOHNSON’S DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 161 (4th ed.) (reprinted 1978); THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 20 
(2d ed.1989)). As Halbrook explains, 
Webster was certainly in a position to know what the second amendment 
phrase “bear arms” meant. A prominent federalist, he wrote the first major 
pamphlet in support of the Constitution when it was proposed in 1787, in 
which he stated: “Before a standing army can rule, the people must be 
disarmed; as they are in almost every Kingdom in Europe. The supreme 
power in America cannot enforce unjust laws by the sword; because the 
whole body of the people are armed . . . . 
Stephen P. Halbrook, What the Framers Intended: A Linguistic Analysis of the Right to 
“Bear Arms,” 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 151, 157 (1986). Of the circuit courts that have 
found “special need” laws constitutional, only two—the First Circuit, in Gould v. Morgan, 
907 F.3d 659, 667 (1st Cir. 2018), and the Third Circuit, in Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 
444 (3d Cir. 2013)––quoted this key textual analysis from Heller.  
124 Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 936 (7th Cir. 2012).  
125 Rosenthal & Malcolm, supra note 116, at 443 n.33. 
126 Heller, 554 U.S. at 584. 
127 Id. at 584–85 (citing ALA. CONST. art. I, § 23 (1819); CONN. CONST. art. I, § 17 
(1818);  IND. CONST. art. I, § 20 (1816); MISS. CONST. art. I, § 23 (1817); MO. CONST. art. 
XIII, § 3 (1820); OHIO CONST. art. VIII, § 20 (1802); PA. CONST. ch. I, § XIII (1776); VT. 
CONST., ch. I, § XV (1793)). 
128 See id. (“Although the phrase implies that the carrying of the weapon is for the purpose 
of ‘offensive or defensive action,’ it in no way connotes participation in a structured 
military organization.”).  





As Second Amendment scholars have posited,129 that to “bear arms” 
meant and means merely to carry firearms was evident in game legislation 
written by Thomas Jefferson and presented by James Madison in the Virginia 
legislature. The proposed legislation imposed fines on those who killed or 
hunted deer beyond the defined season and required they post a bond to “be 
bound to their good behaviour.”130 If the individual “shall bear a gun out of 
his inclosed ground, unless whilst performing military duty,” within a year of 
his violation, “it shall be deemed a breach of the recognizance.”131 Moving 
forward, the law would deem “every such bearing of a gun” as a new 
breach, requiring another bond.132 Thus, Thomas Jefferson and James 
Madison (a draftsman of the Second Amendment) believed that “to ‘bear’ 
a gun meant to carry it about in one’s hands or on one’s person, as for 
instance a deer hunter would do.”133  
Had the “bear-means-carry” explication been the end of the Supreme 
Court’s textual analysis in Heller, the scope of the Second Amendment’s core 
protections may well have remained unsettled. But the opinion went on to 
clarify that in the context of the Second Amendment, to “bear,” when paired 
with “arms,” means not just to carry weapons, but rather to do so “‘for the 
purpose . . . of being armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in a 
case of conflict with another person.’”134 As Second Amendment scholar 
 
129 Halbrook, supra note 123, at 153. 
130 A Bill for Preservation of Deer (Oct. 31, 1785), in 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 
443–44 (Julian P. Boyd ed. 1950). 
131 Id. at 444 (emphasis added). It is also clear from this language that “bearing arms” is not 
a phrase solely associated with militia duty, for the legislation’s language refers to the 
“‘bearing of a gun’ by any person when not ‘performing military duty.’” Halbrook, supra 
note 123, at 153. 
132 A Bill for Preservation of Deer, supra note 130, at 444.  
133 Halbrook, supra note 123, at 153. Importantly, although this game bill would have 
prohibited the public carriage of “scatterguns and other long guns for hunting, it would not 
have prohibited carrying pistols for self-defense,” because “[a]t that time, ‘one species of 
fire-arms, the pistol[,] [was] never called a gun.’” Id.  
134 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 584 (2008) (citing Muscarello v. United 
States, 524 U.S. 125, 130 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Carry Arms or 
Weapons, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990))). But Kaplan explains 
[I]t’s simpler to blame any “confrontation” meaning on extra words, for 
example in the Kentucky [constitutional] provision, the words “in defence 
of themselves.” It is not clear why Scalia makes this “for confrontation” 
claim, since he later writes, “If ‘bear arms’ means, as we think, simply 
the carrying of arms, a modifier can limit the purpose of the carriage (‘for 
the purpose of self-defense’ or ‘to make war against the King’) 
Jeffrey P. Kaplan, Unfaithful to Textualism, 10 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 385, 420–21 (2012). 
Even though “the phrase implies that the carrying of the weapon is for the purpose of 
 





Michael O’Shea stated, “It verges on the superfluous to note that this passage 
supports the interpretation that the Second Amendment protects a right to 
carry a handgun outside the home to have it available for self-defense against 
unlawful assault: the passage is essentially an announcement of that 
interpretation.”135 This is because the potential for confrontation is not 
limited to within one’s home and curtilage.136 Therefore, carrying firearms 
beyond the home for the purpose of self-defense “fits comfortably within 
Heller’s definition of ‘bear.’”137 
 Yet even without this controlling passage from the Supreme Court, 
the fact that the Second Amendment speaks of both a right to “keep” arms 
and a right to “bear” arms necessarily implies not just the right to carry in 
public, but the right to do so in case of confrontation. This implication 
stems from the rule against surplusage.138 As the Ninth Circuit syllogized: 
A right to “keep” arms, on its own, necessarily implies a 
right to carry those arms to some extent. For instance, in 
order to “keep” arms, one would have to carry them home 
from the place of purchase and occasionally move them 
from storage place to storage place. The addition of a 
separate right to “bear” arms, beyond keeping them, should 
therefore protect something more than mere carrying 
incidental to keeping arms. Understanding “bear” to protect 
at least some level of carrying in anticipation of conflict 
outside of the home provides the necessary gap between 
“keep” and “bear” to avoid rendering the latter guarantee as 
mere surplusage. 139  
In sum, the Supreme Court has interpreted “the right . . . to . . . bear 
arms” in the Constitution to mean the right to carry guns outside the home 
for the purpose of self-defense, and a reading via the surplusage canon of 
 
‘offensive or defensive action,’”  the Court emphasized that “it in no way connotes 
participation in a structured military organization.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 584. 
135 Michael P. O’Shea, Modeling the Second Amendment Right to Carry Arms (I): Judicial 
Tradition and the Scope of “Bearing Arms” for Self-Defense, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 585, 613 
(2012); see also Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 658 (7th Cir. 2017) (“That 
definition shows that the Amendment’s core must span, in the Court’s own words, the ‘right 
to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.’” (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 592)). 
136 See Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 657 (“After all, the Amendment’s core lawful purpose is self-
defense, and the need for that might arise beyond as well as within the home.” (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted)); Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 941 (7th Cir. 
2012) (“[T]he interest in self-protection is as great outside as inside the home.”). 
137 Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044, 1052 (9th Cir. 2018). 
138 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) (“It cannot be presumed 
that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect . . . .”). 
139 Young, 896 F.3d at 1052–53 (citations omitted).   





the text compels that interpretation. If that is indeed the plain meaning, it 
is difficult to fathom how a regulation affecting an individual’s ability to 
carry firearms outside the home in self-defense fails to implicate a core 
Second Amendment right.  
 
B. Historical Review 
 
[I]f you could ask Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, 
or John Hancock after the adoption of the Bill of Rights 
whether they had an individual right to carry arms and use 
them for self-defense . . . they would have laughed at you. 
Of course they had that right, they would have said. The 
Second Amendment didn’t give it to them; it simply 
recognized a right Americans had always had in common 
law and protected it.140 
 
As the Court repeatedly emphasized in Heller, “the Second 
Amendment was not intended to lay down a ‘novel principl[e]’ but rather 
codified a right ‘inherited from our English ancestors.’”141 We therefore 
must look to the historical background of the Second Amendment to 
determine that pre-existing right.142 Tracing this right from fourteenth 
century England, to the founding of the United States, through the Civil 
War and the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is clear that the 
right of self-defense, wherever the need may arise, is at the core of the 
Constitution’s protections. As St. George Tucker, the first prominent 
commentator on the U.S. Constitution,143 wrote roughly a dozen years after 
the ratification of the Second Amendment, the right to keep and bear arms 
“may be considered as the true palladium of liberty . . . [t]he right of self 
defence is the first law of nature.”144 That this law of nature could be 
confined to one’s home is unreasonable.  
 
140 CRAIG R. WHITNEY, LIVING WITH GUNS: A LIBERAL’S CASE FOR THE SECOND 
AMENDMENT 147 (2012).  
141 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008) (alteration in original) (citing 
Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897)).  
142 Id. at 592.  
143 O’Shea, supra note 135, at 637. Tucker was a law professor at the College of William & 
Mary and eventually became a judge on the federal district court and the Virginia Court of 
Appeals. Id.  
144 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, 1 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO 
THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND 
OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA app. 140 n.D (1803). The Supreme Court looked to 
 





1. English Law 
 
The earliest law cited in the debate on the scope of the Second 
Amendment is the Statute of Northampton, which restricted the English right 
to bear arms beginning in 1328.145 As the D.C. Circuit jested, reading the law 
is like “studying Canterbury Tales—in the original.”146 The statute prohibited 
any ordinary Englishman147 from “bring[ing] . . . force in affray of the peace, 
[or] . . . rid[ing] armed by night [or] by day, in Fairs, Markets, [or] in the 
presence of the Justices or other Ministers, [or] . . . elsewhere.”148 Advocates 
for “special need” laws assert that this language effectively banned the 
carriage of weapons in “densely populated areas.”149 Since laws modeled 
after the Statute of Northampton were adopted by the colonies and 
eventually by the states in the mid to late 1800s,150 a more limited 
understanding of the Second Amendment maintains that it could not have 
codified, at its core, a preexisting right to carry firearms outside the home 
in densely populated areas.151  
 But this argument is foreclosed by Heller, which accepts 
Blackstone’s understanding of the Northampton Statute prohibiting only 
 
Tucker as a source for the original understanding of the Second Amendment in both Heller 
and McDonald. Heller, 554 U.S. at 594–95, 606; McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 
742, 769 (2010). In Heller, the Court labeled Tucker’s version of Blackstone’s 
Commentaries “the most important early American edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries.” 
554 U.S. at 594.  
145 Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
146 Id. 
147 The statute excepted the King’s servants and ministers. Statute of Northampton 1328, 2 
Edw. 3 c. 3 (Eng.). 
148 Id. 
149 Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 659; see also Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044, 1063 (9th Cir. 2018) 
(interpreting the language in the Statute of Northampton to prohibit “concealed carry”). 
150 Compare Statute of Northampton 1328, 2 Edw. 3 c. 3 (Eng.) (providing that no one shall 
“come before the King's justices, or other of the King’s ministers doing their office, with 
force and arms, nor bring no force in affray of the peace, nor to go nor ride armed by night 
nor by day, in fairs, markets, nor in the presence of the justices or other ministers . . . .”) with, 
e.g., ACTS AND LAWS PASSED BY THE GREAT AND GENERAL COURTS OF ASSEMBLY OF THEIR 
MAJESTIES PROVINCE OF THE MASSACHUSETTS-BAY 18 (1692) (“That every Justice of the 
Peace . . . may cause to be Staid and Arrested all . . . [who] shall Ride, or go Armed 
offensively before any of Their Majesties Justices, or other Their Officers or Ministers doing 
their Office, or elsewhere, By Night or by Day, in Fear or Affray of Their Majesties Liege 
People . . .”), and FRANCOIS-XAVIER MARTIN, A COLLECTION OF STATUTES OF PARLIAMENT 
OF ENGLAND IN FORCE IN THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 60–61 (Newbern 1792) 
(providing that no person shall “nor ride armed by night nor by day, in fairs, markets nor in 
the presence of the King’s Justices, or other ministers, nor in no part elsewhere”).  
151 Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 659. 





“dangerous and unusual weapons.”152 There is further evidence that the 
Statute of Northampton was interpreted to bar people from carrying arms 
with some sort of mal-intent, in order to “terrify the King’s subjects.”153 
Unless the bearing of arms was done in a manner “apt to terrify the People,” 
Serjeant William Hawkins wrote, normal individuals carrying “common 
Weapons” were “in no Danger of Offending . . . [the] Statute.”154 Thus, 
early English law did not, as supporters of “special need” regulations claim, 
prevent “Englishmen from carrying common (not unusual) arms for defense 
(not terror).”155 To the contrary, the arms provision of the English Bill of 
Rights conferred one of the “absolute rights of every Englishman”:156 “the 
 
152 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008) (quoting 4 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *149)). Blackstone explained that “going armed, with 
dangerous or unusual weapons, is a crime against the public peace, by terrifying the good 
people of the land.” 5 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *149. Heller’s historical 
analysis also relied upon other early writers who made this same connection between carry 
and affray. See JOHN DUNLAP, THE NEW-YORK JUSTICE 8 (1815) (“It is likewise said to be 
an affray, at common law, for a man to arm himself… in such manner as will naturally cause 
terror to the people.”); CHARLES HUMPHREYS, A COMPENDIUM OF THE COMMON LAW IN 
FORCE IN KENTUCKY 482 (1822) (making “[r]iding or going armed with dangerous or 
unusual weapons” a “crime against the public peace”); ELLIS LEWIS, AN ABRIDGMENT OF 
THE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 64 (1847) (stating that open carry of weapons 
“in such a manner as will naturally cause a terror” as having always been “an offence at 
common law”); 1 SIR WILLIAM OLDNALL RUSSELL, A TREATISE ON CRIMES AND 
INDICTABLE MISDEMEANORS 271 (1831) (defining “going armed” as an affray in the same 
language as Blackstone); HENRY J. STEPHEN, SUMMARY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 48 (1840) 
(discussing the Northampton statute); 3 JAMES WILSON, WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE JAMES 
WILSON 79 (1804) (“[T]here may be an affray . . . as where a man arms himself with 
dangerous and unusual weapons, in such a manner, as will naturally diffuse a terrour among 
the people.”); FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES 726 (1852) (describing affray under the aforementioned circumstances as “always 
an offence at common law” and “strictly prohibited by . . . statute”). Historical state court 
opinions echo this interpretation. See O’Neill v. State, 16 Ala. 65, 67 (1849) (stating that it 
is an offence to arm oneself with “deadly or unusual weapons for the purpose of an affray”); 
State v. Lanier, 71 N.C. 288, 289 (1874) (“The elementary writers say that the offence of 
going armed with dangerous or unusual weapons is a crime against the public peace by 
terrifying the good people of the land . . . .”); State v. Langford, 10 N.C. (1 Hawks) 381, 383 
(1824) (stating that it has always “been an offence at common law” to carry dangerous and 
unusual weapons (quoting 1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 
135 § 4 (1716))); English v. State, 35 Tex. 473, 476 (1871) (“Blackstone says, the offense of 
riding or going around with dangerous or unusual weapons is a crime against the public 
peace, by terrifying the good people of the land.”). 
153 Sir John Knight’s Case (1686), 87 Eng. Rep. 75, 76 (K.B.).  
154 HAWKINS, supra note 152, at 136 § 9. Serjeant William Hawkins was “an English legal 
commentator praised by Blackstone.” Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044, 1064 (9th Cir. 2018).  
155 Young, 896 F.3d at 1064. 
156 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *122, *127 (1803). 





natural right of resistance and self-preservation,”157 and “the right of having 
and using arms for self-preservation and defence.”158  
 Even if the Statute of Northampton’s proscriptions were 
ambiguous, however, that ambiguity is of little relevance in this American 
debate.159 For one, there is “scholarly consensus” that the English right to 
keep and bear arms was less comprehensive than its American 
counterpart.160 Heller notes as much.161 Moreover, for the purposes of 
determining original meaning, the critical question is not so much what 
the statute actually meant, but rather what the Framers understood it to 
mean. And “[t]o the extent the Framers considered the Statute of 
Northampton as instructive of the pre-existing right to bear arms, they took 
a narrow view of its prohibitions.”162 James Wilson, considered by some 
scholars to be the true “Father of America’s Constitution,”163 cited 
Hawkins in interpreting the Statute of Northampton as barring the public 
carriage of only “dangerous and unusual weapons, in such a manner, as 
 
157 Id. at *143.  
158 Id. at *144.  
159 See Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 660 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“Happily, though, 
the state of the law in Chaucer’s England—or for that matter Shakespeare’s or Cromwell’s—
is not decisive here.”).  
160 Young, 896 F.3d at 1065 (citing Jonathan Meltzer, Note, Open Carry for All: Heller and 
Our Nineteenth-Century Second Amendment, 123 YALE L.J. 1486, 1500 (2014); JOYCE LEE 
MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT 120–
21 (1994)). As Tucker observed, it would have been inappropriate to impose in the United 
States an English law that created a rebuttable presumption that any gathering of armed men 
was treasonous, because “the right to bear arms is recognized and secured in the [American] 
constitution itself.” See 5 TUCKER, supra note 144, at 19 app. n.B. Indeed, Tucker reasoned, 
“[i]n many parts of the United States, a man no more thinks, of going out of his house on any 
occasion, without his rifle or musket in his hand, than a European fine gentleman without his 
sword by his side.” Id.; see also THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 270 (1880) (noting that the 
Second Amendment “was adopted with some modification and enlargement from the English 
Bill of Rights”); WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA 126 (2d ed. 1829) (writing that the English right, unlike the Second 
Amendment, “is allowed more or less sparingly, according to circumstances”). 
161 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 593 (2008) (explaining that the English right 
was “not available to the whole population, given that it was restricted to Protestants, and 
like all written English rights it was held only against the Crown, not Parliament”). 
162 Young, 896 F.3d at 1065 (citing Eugene Volokh, The First and Second Amendments, 109 
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 97, 101 (2009)).  
163 Nicholas Pedersen, Note, The Lost Founder: James Wilson in American Memory, 22 
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 257, 335–36 (2010). 





will naturally diffuse a terrour [sic] among the people.”164 William Rawle, 
“a prominent lawyer” and “member of the Pennsylvania Assembly that 
ratified the Constitution,”165 agreed, explaining that the right to keep and 
bear arms could not “be abused to the disturbance of the public peace.”166 
Citing Hawkins, Rawle theorized that the Second Amendment would not 
prohibit, for example, a law penalizing an individual for carrying arms 
“attended with circumstances giving just reason to fear that he purposes to 
make an unlawful use of them . . . .”167 And more to the point, Heller made 
clear that by the time of the Founding, the “preexisting right” codified by the 
Second Amendment had developed to unambiguously safeguard the right to 
carry firearms more broadly than that granted by even a generous reading of 
the Statute of Northampton.168 
 
2. The Framers’ Intent 
 
That the Second Amendment guaranteed the right to bear arms for self-
defense is evidenced by the words of the Founding Fathers themselves.169 In his 
argument for the defense during the Boston Massacre trial,170 John Adams 
quoted Hawkins, reasoning that “the killing of dangerous rioters may be 
justified by any private persons, who cannot otherwise suppress them or defend 
themselves from them, inasmuch as every private person seems to be authorized 
by the law to arm himself for the purposes aforesaid.”171 Likewise, Adams went 
on to explain, in the colonies, “every private person is authorized to arm himself; 
 
164 2 JAMES WILSON, THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 654 (Robert G. McCloskey ed. 1967); 
see also Volokh, The First supra note 162, at 101 (“American benchbooks for justices of the 
peace echoed [Wilson’s observation], citing Hawkins . . . .”). 
165 Heller, 554 U.S. at 607.  
166 RAWLE, supra note 160, at 126.   
167 Id.  
168 Heller, 554 U.S. at 602 (“[P]re-Second Amendment state constitutional provisions . . .  
secured an individual right to bear arms for defensive purposes.”).  
169 Halbrook, supra note 123, at 155 (“Bearing arms for personal protection was an 
unquestioned right in the minds of the Founding Fathers.”). It was evidenced by their conduct 
as well; the Founding Fathers’ frequent carriage of firearms for self-defense demonstrates 
their belief that such usage was part and parcel of the right codified by the Second 
Amendment. Infra notes 179–185 and accompanying text. 
170 The 1770 Boston Massacre trial, or Wemms trial (after one of the British soldiers 
accused), involved the criminal prosecution of British soldiers for firing on a harassing 
crowd. See John Adams, The Boston Massacre: First Day’s Speech in Defence of the British 
Soldiers Accused of Murdering Attucks, Gray and Others, in the Boston Riot of 1770, in 6 
MASTERPIECES OF ELOQUENCE 2569–93 (Mayo W. Hazeltine et al. eds., 1905) (providing 
Adams’ argument for the defense).  
171 Id. at 2577–78 (quoting HAWKINS, supra note 152, at 71 § 14). 





and on the strength of this authority, I do not deny the inhabitants had a right to 
arm themselves at that time, for their defence . . . .”172  
Thomas Jefferson, in his Legal Commonplace Book,173 copied verbatim 
eighteenth century criminologist Cesare Beccaria’s condemnation of “[l]e leggi, 
che proibiscono di portar le armi,” which translates to laws that forbid one 
to “wear”174 arms.  Such laws, Beccaria argued in the passage copied by 
Jefferson, “disarm[] those only who are not disposed to commit the crime 
which the laws mean to prevent.”175 After the battles of Lexington and 
Concord, North Carolina’s delegation to the Continental Congress stated 
that “It is the Right of every English Subject to be prepared with Weapons 
for his Defense.”176 In his book defending the various state constitutions 
that had been written since the Revolution, Adams affirmed the right of 
“arms in the hands of citizens, to be used at individual discretion . . . in 
private self-defense . . . .”177  
Importantly, none of these statements or actions affirming an 
individual right to bear arms for self-defense reference the home; in fact, 
to read them as such would be awkwardly and illogically restrictive. And 
when the home was specifically mentioned in delineating the scope of the 
right to keep and bear arms, it was listed as something—but not the only 
thing—worth defending. For example, considering the ratification of the 
Second Amendment, James Wilson interpreted the Pennsylvania 
 
172 Id. at 2578. 
173 Jefferson’s Commonplace Book “may well be considered as the source-book and 
repertory of Jefferson’s ideas on government.” Gilbert Chinard, Introduction to THE 
COMMONPLACE BOOK OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 1, 4 (Gilbert Chinard ed., 1926). 
174 CESARE BECCARIA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 161 (Mons de Voltaire trans., 
1767). This translation was reproduced in the 1809 edition of Beccaria’s text, CESARE 
BECCARIA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 124 (Stephen Gould trans., 1809), which 
Jefferson owned. Laws that Forbid the Carrying of Arms…(Spurious Quotation), THOMAS 
JEFFERSON MONTICELLO, https://www.monticello.org/site/research-and-collections/laws-forbid 
-carrying-armsspurious-quotation [https://perma.cc/35TU-F843] (last visited Mar. 17, 2020). 
175 BECCARIA, supra note 174, at 161; CESARE BECCARIA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND 
PUNISHMENTS 124 (Stephen Gould trans., 1809). 
176 Halbrook, supra note 123, at 155 (citing Hooper et al., To the Committees, N.C. GAZETTE, 
July 7, 1775, at 2).  
177 3 JOHN ADAMS, A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA 475 (1788) (“To suppose arms in the hands of citizens, to be used at 
individual discretion, except in private self-defence, or by partial orders of towns . . . is a 
dissolution of the government.”). Adams acknowledged the “individual right to use arms for 
personal protection, but looked askance at the kind of armed protest exemplified in Shays’ 
Rebellion.” Stephen P. Halbrook, The Right of the People or the Power of the State: Bearing 
Arms, Arming Militias, and the Second Amendment, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 131, 165 (1991). 





Constitution as recognizing the natural right of defense “of one’s person 
or house”—what he deemed the law of “self preservation.”178 
Bearing arms in public for personal protection was a right evidenced 
by the Framers’ conduct in addition to their words.179 “[W]hen George 
Washington traveled between Alexandria and Mount Vernon he holstered 
pistols to his saddle, ‘as was then the custom.’”180 Another Founding Father, 
Patrick Henry, lived “just north of Hanover town, but close enough for him 
to walk to court, his musket slung over his shoulder to pick off small game . 
. . .”181 Thomas Jefferson was known to carry pocket pistols (on display today 
at Monticello), and advised his nephew to do much the same.182 In fact, 
Jefferson “once left his pistol at an inn between Monticello and Washington, 
D.C. and asked two friends—both members of Congress—to retrieve it and 
bring it to him at the White House.”183 William Henry Drayton, Chief Justice 
of the South Carolina Supreme Court and the State’s delegate to the 
Continental Congress, “always had about his person, a dirk and a pair of 
pocket pistols; for the defense of his life . . . .”184 Ethan Allan, Revolutionary 
war leader and founder of the State of Vermont, and his friends “never walked 






178 WILSON, supra note 164, at 1142 (quoting PA. CONST., art. IX, § 21, amended by PA. 
CONST., art. I, § 21 (“The right of the citizens to bear arms in defence of themselves shall not 
be questioned.”). Pre–Second Amendment state constitutional provisions, furthermore, shed 
light on the original meaning of the U.S. Constitution’s language. See District of Columbia 
v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 602–03 (2008) (describing “Second Amendment analogues” in the 
framework of eighteenth and early nineteenth century state constitutions). 
179 In fact, in many areas of the nascent nation, the public carriage of arms was not only 
common, but required. See NICHOLAS J. JOHNSON ET. AL., FIREARMS LAW AND THE SECOND 
AMENDMENT 183 (2d. ed. 2018) (“The majority of the colonies required arms-carrying in 
certain circumstances.”). 
180 Grace v. District of Columbia, 187 F. Supp. 3d 124, 137 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting 
BENJAMIN OGLE TAYLOE, IN MEMORIAM 95 (1872)).  
181 HARLOW GILES UNGER, LION OF LIBERTY: PATRICK HENRY AND THE CALL TO A NEW 
NATION 30 (2010).  
182 Halbrook, supra note 123, at 154; see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Peter Carr 
(Aug. 10. 1787), in 8 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFerson 407 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1953) (“Let 
your gun therefore be the constant companion of your walks.”).   
183 Grace, 187 F. Supp. 3d at 137 (citations omitted).  
184 Halbrook, supra note 123, at 155 (citing 1 JOHN DRAYTON, MEMOIRS OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 378 (1821)).  
185 Id. (citing 1 JAMES BENJAMIN WILBUR, IRA ALLEN: FOUNDER OF VERMONT 1751–1814, 
at 44 (1928). 





3. Post-Civil War Discourse 
 
Finally, as did the Court in Heller, we must consider the interpretation 
of the right to bear arms following the Civil War.186 Although “considering 
materials that post-date the Bill of Rights by at least seventy-five years might 
stretch the term ‘original public meaning,’”187 the Court in Heller specifically 
noted the importance of this era, explaining that, “[i]n the aftermath of the 
Civil War, there was an outpouring of discussion of the Second Amendment 
in Congress and in public discourse, as people debated whether and how to 
secure constitutional rights for newly free slaves.”188 Thus, even though such 
discussions “do not provide as much insight into [the Second Amendment’s] 
original meaning as earlier sources,” they are nevertheless instructive.189  
Especially pertinent to the question of whether the Second Amendment 
protects the right to carry firearms in public are the “systematic efforts” of 
Southern states to disarm and subjugate African-Americans after the Civil 
War.190 Gripped with anxiety about an uprising among the newly freed slaves 
and seeking to retain white supremacy,191 many states enacted Black Codes, 
which barred African-Americans from possessing firearms altogether.192 
Throughout the South, armed gangs seized firearms from newly freed slaves in 
a systematic effort to disarm African-American communities.193 “Without 
 
186 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 614–16 (2008) (discussing the public 
debate over the meaning of the Second Amendment in the period following the Civil War). 
187 Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044, 1059 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 614).  
188 Heller, 554 U.S. at 614. 
189 Id.  
190 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 771 (2010). 
191 Representative Thaddeus Stevens reportedly pondered, “when it was first proposed to free 
the slaves, and arm the blacks, did not half the nation tremble? The prim conservatives, the 
snobs, and the male waiting-maids in Congress, were in hysterics.” Id. at 846 (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE ERA 
OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1865–1877, at 104 (1965)).  
192 Emblematic of these efforts was an 1865 law in Mississippi that declared “no freedman, 
free negro or mulatto . . . shall keep or carry fire-arms of any kind, or any ammunition, dirk 
or bowie knife.” Id. at 771 (quoting 1 WALTER L. FLEMING, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
RECONSTRUCTION 289 (1950)); see also An Act Concerning Free Persons of Color, their 
Guardians, and Colored Preachers, 155 § 7, 1833 Ga. Laws 808 (repealed) (“[I]t shall not be 
lawful for any free person of color in this State, to own, use, or carry fire-arms of any 
description whatever.”); The Freedman’s Bureau Bill, EVENING POST: N.Y., May 30, 1866 
(“In South Carolina and Florida the freedmen are forbidden to wear or keep arms.”). 
193 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 847 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). To enforce the gun ban, white men riding in posses would terrorize black 
communities, “seiz[ing] every gun and pistol found in the hands of the (so called) freedmen 
. . . .” The Labor Question at the South, 10 HARPER’S WKLY., Jan. 13, 1866, at 17, 19.“The 
 





federal enforcement of the inalienable right to keep and bear arms, these militias 
and mobs were tragically successful in waging a campaign of terror” against 
newly-freed slaves.194 Justice Thomas provides a harrowing account of such 
atrocities in his McDonald concurrence, detailing, inter alia, the Hamburg 
Massacre of 1876 and the murder of Emmett Till.195 In former Confederate 
States, “[t]he use of firearms for self-defense was often the only way black 
citizens could protect themselves from mob violence.”196 
These widespread inequalities and acts of barbarism drove Congress 
to enact the Freedmen’s Bureau Act of 1866 and the Civil Rights Act of 
1866 to protect African-Americans in the Reconstruction South.197 And 
even congressmen who opposed such federal actions recognized the 
fundamental constitutional protections at stake as including the right to 
carry firearms in public: Senator Davis of Kentucky noted the right “for 
every man bearing his arms about him and keeping them in his house, his 
castle, for his own defense,” but contended that congressional measures 
would usurp the traditional state role in caring for its own citizens.198  
But as the mob violence continued, Congress “ultimately deemed 
these legislative remedies insufficient” and approved the Fourteenth 
Amendment.199 Viewed against this backdrop of widespread violence 
against and disarmament of African-Americans in the Reconstruction 
South, it is clear that the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment considered 
that the individual right to use firearms in self-defense—granted by the 
Second Amendment and reinforced by the Fourteenth—was “essential to 
the preservation of liberty.”200 
 
most infamous of these disarmament posses, of course, was the Ku Klux Klan.” Winkler, 
supra note 88.  
194 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 856 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
195 Id. at 856–58. In the Hamburg Massacre, “a white citizen militia sought out and murdered 
a troop of black militiamen for no other reason than that they had dared to conduct a 
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Howard of Michigan, a major drafter of the Fourteenth Amendment, stated that its 
 








There are two primary historical arguments put forth to counter the 
notion that the original intent behind the Second Amendment protected the 
public carriage of firearms in self-defense: surety laws and prohibitions on 
concealed carry.  
The first argument contends that the Second Amendment’s core 
excludes carrying (absent some demonstrably elevated need for self-defense) 
because such public carriage was always hemmed in by “surety laws” dating 
back to fourteenth century England and replicated in the nineteenth century by 
several states.201 As the D.C. Circuit explained:  
These laws provided that if Oliver carried a pistol and Thomas 
said he reasonably feared that Oliver would injure him or breach 
the peace, Oliver had to post a bond to be used to cover any 
damage he might do, unless he proved he had reason to fear 
injury to his person or family or property. 202 
If an arms carrier gave someone “reasonable cause to fear an injury, 
or breach of the peace,” that person could file a complaint with his local 
magistrate, who in turn would evaluate the complaint and, if he found it valid, 
could require the potentially hazardous carrier “to find sureties for keeping 
the peace”—in other words, post a bond to ensure their good behavior.203 But 
if the carrier himself had “reasonable cause to fear an assault or other injury,” 
he could be relieved from posting the bond, notwithstanding the valid 
complaint against him. 204 
 States cite these surety laws as founding-era precursors to the “special 
need” regulations on the books today.205 Given their historical pedigree, 
proponents argue, laws requiring individuals demonstrate “good reason to 
 
“privileges and immunities” guaranteed, inter alia, “the right to keep and bear arms.” CONG. 
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866). Professor Akhil Reed Amar affirmed this 
background behind the Fourteenth Amendment: “between 1775 and 1866 the poster boy of 
arms morphed from the Concord minuteman to the Carolina freedman.” AKHIL REED AMAR, 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 266 (1998).  
201 See, e.g., REV. STAT. MASS. tit. 2, ch. 134, § 16 (1836) (warning that a person may “be 
required to find sureties for keeping the peace” if he invoked reasonable fear in others by 
carrying an “offensive and dangerous weapon”); REV. STAT. MICH. tit. 31, ch. 163, § 16 
(1846) (warning that a person may “be required to find sureties for keeping the peace” if he 
invoked reasonable fear in others by carrying an “offensive and dangerous weapon”). 
202 Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
203 Usually “for a term not exceeding six months.” REV. STAT. MASS. tit. 2, § 16.  
204 Id. 
205 See, e.g., Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 659 (explaining the District’s reliance on surety laws to 
bolster its argument for its “special needs” regulation). 





fear injury” in order to carry firearms in public demonstrate that public 
carriage—even for self-defense—has always been understood to fall outside 
the core of the Second Amendment’s protections.206 But early surety laws are 
not on all fours with today’s “special need” regulations. Surety laws did not 
require that anyone who sought to carry a firearm in public demonstrate a 
reasonable cause to fear injury; only those who posed a credible threat were 
asked to prove this particular need, and even then, only to avoid posting a 
bond.207 As the D.C. Circuit explained: 
Under surety laws, put simply, everyone started out with robust 
carrying rights. Those reasonably accused were then burdened. 
And only then did self-defense needs make a difference, by 
exempting even the accused from that burden. A showing of 
special need did not expand carrying for the responsible; it 
shrank burdens on carrying by the (allegedly) reckless.208 
Thus, surety laws did not restrict the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens 
to bear arms in self-defense and do nothing to refute the argument that this 
right is at the core of the Second Amendment’s protections.209  
 The second historical argument made to support the claim that public 
carriage for the purpose of self-defense must fall outside the Second 
Amendment’s core protections involves the long historical record of bans on 
concealed carry. Such prohibitions, which date back to the nineteenth century, 
are cited as evidence that the right of public carriage generally—even for self-
defense—must fall outside the Second Amendment’s core protections.210 But 
 
206 Id. 
207 Id. at 661. 
208 Id.  
209 And even if surety laws had required all citizens demonstrate a special need for self-
defense in order to carry firearms (or otherwise post bonds), such regulations, longstanding 
as they may be, are largely irrelevant to the scope of the right to bear arms. This is because 
the Supreme Court has rejected the contention that laws imposing only “a small fine and 
forfeiture of the weapon (or in a few cases a very brief stay in the local jail)” carry much 
weight in defining the natural right codified by the Second Amendment. District of Columbia 
v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 633 (2008). Such minor penalties (like sureties) are “‘akin to modern 
penalties for minor public-safety infractions like speeding or jaywalking,’ which makes them 
(in the Court’s view) poor evidence of limits on the [Second] Amendment’s scope.” Wrenn, 
864 F.3d at 661 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 633–34). And sureties can be considered even 
less burdensome than small fines, since a potentially hazardous carrier, once he posted his 
bond, could “go on carrying without criminal penalty,” and, without incident, eventually get 
back that money. Id.  
210 See, e.g., Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 90 (2d Cir. 2012) (observing 
that, although several nineteenth-century courts struck down complete bans on carrying, 
three upheld bans on bearing concealed weapons); see also Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 
433 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing concealed carry bans to support the claim of a “longstanding 
 





there is a straightforward way to reconcile this widespread and tolerated 
restriction on concealed carry with the notion that bearing arms in public for self-
defense is indeed a core Second Amendment protection: the “ample alternative 
channels” theory.211 
In First Amendment cases, for example, the government may 
lawfully impose “time, place, or manner” restrictions on protected speech, 
permitted they, inter alia, “leave open ample alternative channels for 
communication of the information.”212 The same principle applies in the 
context of the Second Amendment: “[t]he rights to keep and to bear, to 
possess and to carry, are equally important inasmuch as regulations on 
each must leave alternative channels for both.”213 Focusing on the right to 
bear arms specifically, laws restricting the carriage of firearms are 
tolerable insofar as they leave “ample opportunities for bearing arms.”214 
Following this outlet principle, the Court has “favorably treated cases 
allowing bans on concealed carry only so long as open carry was 
allowed.”215 As articulated by Judge Hardiman in dissent, the principle 
 
tradition of regulating the public carrying of weapons for self-defense”); Woollard v. 
Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 876 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Masciandaro, 638 
F.3d 458, 470–71 (4th Cir. 2011), for the claim that “as we move outside the home, firearm 
rights have always been more limited,” as is evidenced by court decisions upholding bans on 
concealed carry). 
211 See Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 662 (citing Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 
1244, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 2011)) (describing Heller II as “analogizing certain gun laws deserving 
modest review to regulations that leave ‘ample alternative channels’ for speech”). 
212 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (citing Clark v. Cmty. for Creative 
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)); see also Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna 
Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 648 (1981) (quoting Va. State Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)) (noting that there were “ample alternative 
channels for communication of the information” in upholding a law limiting solicitation 
on state fairgrounds).  
213 Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 662 (citing Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1262).  
214 Id. For example, bans on carrying firearms in small, specified areas of the outside world 
(e.g., in “sensitive places, such as schools and government buildings,” Heller, 554 U.S. at 
626) impose very little on most people’s ability to “bear arms” in public, because they can 
“preserve an undiminished right of self-defense by not entering those places . . . .” Wrenn, 
864 F.3d at 662 (citing Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 940 (7th Cir. 2012)).  
215 Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 662. As Judge Hardiman explained, 
This distinction is significant because courts have long distinguished 
between these two types of carry, holding that although a State may 
prohibit the open or concealed carry of firearms, it may not ban both 
because a complete prohibition on public carry violates the Second 
Amendment and analogous state constitutional provisions. 
Drake, 724 F.3d at 449 (Hardiman, J., dissenting). Although the Court in Heller 
acknowledged  that “the majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the question held 
 





underlying these precedents “is that a prohibition against both open and 
concealed carry without a permit is different in kind, not merely in degree, 
from a prohibition covering only one type of carry.”216 Thus, antebellum 
laws that banned only concealed carry cannot be interpreted to suggest 
that the Second Amendment fails to protect, at its core, all public carriage. 
To the contrary, such laws have only passed constitutional muster because 
they left a viable outlet for the exercise of the right to bear arms. 
 
C. Judicial Precedent 
 
The Supreme Court’s Second Amendment jurisprudence implicitly 
recognizes a right to publicly bear arms in self-defense.217 In fact, it is only 
through very large blinders that Heller, and subsequently, McDonald, can 
be read not to confer this protection.218 Moreover, the early state court 
decisions considering the right to bear arms, cited in Heller, confirm this 
interpretation. 
 
1. Historical Judicial Interpretations of the Right to Bear Arms 
 
Heeding Heller’s emphasis on historical import, we first consider 
nineteenth century judicial interpretations of the right to bear arms, 
evaluating both the Second Amendment and its state constitutional 
equivalents. In fact, most of the caselaw Justice Scalia references to 
conclude that the Second Amendment protected an individual right to keep 
and bear arms for self-defense likewise supports the marginally extended 
 
that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under 
the Second Amendment or state analogues,” it noted that antebellum nineteenth century 
cases had interpreted the Second Amendment to guarantee a right to carry firearms openly. 
Rosenthal & Malcolm, supra note 116, at 440–41 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 626, 612–13).  
216 Drake, 724 F.3d at 449 (Hardiman, J., dissenting). 
217 This Section discusses Heller and McDonald, because they are the Supreme Court cases 
that most directly bear on the constitutionality of “special need” laws. For a review of pre-
Heller Second Amendment jurisprudence, see Kyle Hatt, Gun-Shy Originalism: The Second 
Amendment's Original Purpose in District of Columbia v. Heller, 44 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 
505, 507–09 (2011) (discussing and United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939); Presser v. 
Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876); and Dred 
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857)).  
218 See Megan Ruebsamen, The Gun-Shy Commonwealth: Self-Defense and Concealed Carry in 
Post-Heller Massachusetts, 18 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 55, 80–81 (2013) (criticizing 
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argument that the right to carry arms for self-defense in public is equally 
protected.219  
Proceeding in chronological order, we start the review with Bliss v. 
Commonwealth,220 the first reported case to consider the right to bear arms. 
In Bliss, the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that a state statute prohibiting 
concealed carry221 violated the right to bear arms provision of the Kentucky 
constitution,222 despite the continued permissibility of open carry. Declaring 
that the right to bear arms in self- and public-defense was absolute, the court 
concluded that any attempt to restrict that ability—even only partly—was 
unconstitutional.223 Thus, the first court to consider a constitutional provision 
analogous to the Second Amendment “had no doubt that any law restricting 
the public carry of firearms would ‘import a restraint on the right of the 
citizens to bear arms.’”224 Although the Bliss Court’s strict approach—
allowing virtually no regulation of the right to carry firearms—constitutes an 
outlier in Second Amendment jurisprudence,225 its finding that public 
 
219 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 585 n.9 (citing State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612, 616–
17 (1840); Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 250–51 (1846); Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90, 
91–92 (1822); State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489, 489–90 (1850); State v. Shoultz, 25 Mo. 128, 
155 (1857); State v. Huntly, 25 N.C. (3 Ired.) 418, 422–23 (1843); Simpson v. State, 13 Tenn. (5 
Yer.) 356, 360 (1833)). 
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weapons concealed in the manner described in the act, they may, nevertheless, 
bear arms in any other admissible form. But . . . whatever restrains the full and 
complete exercise of that right, though not an entire destruction of it, is 
forbidden by the explicit language of the constitution.  
Id. at 91–92. 
224 Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Bliss, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 
at 90–92).  
225 Scholars have depicted this categorical approach as “the road not taken,” and it has 
remained rare in American jurisprudence. O’Shea, supra note 135, at 597 (quoting Robert J. 
Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, “Never Intended to Be Applied to the White Population”: 
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Jurisprudence?, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1307, 1321 (1995)). 





carriage generally is protected has never been overruled.226 To the contrary, 
the Supreme Court cited Bliss for the argument that the preexisting right 
codified by the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and 
bear arms unrelated to militia service.227  
Over a decade later, in Simpson v. State, the Tennessee Supreme Court 
similarly interpreted the right of freemen “to keep and to bear arms for their 
common defence,” included in the Tennessee Constitution.228 The court 
reversed Simpson’s conviction for affray (i.e. disturbing the peace), after he 
had been armed in public.229 To constitute affray, there must be proof of 
fighting between two or more people, the court reasoned, or else it would run 
afoul of the state’s constitutional arms provision.230 Without proof of violence, 
no such criminal statute could survive given the guarantee “secured to all the 
free citizens of the State to keep and bear arms for their defence . . . .”231 
Simpson thus echoed Bliss in its interpretation of the right to bear arms as an 
absolute right of individuals to carry weapons in public.  
The Alabama Supreme Court entered the fray seven years later, taking 
a more flexible stance on the right to bear arms in State v. Reid.232 The court 
ultimately found Alabama’s prohibition on “carrying weapons secretly” 
permissible under the Alabama Constitution, which granted every citizen the 
right “to bear arms, in defence of himself and the State.”233 That provision, 
the court held, did not “den[y] to the [Alabama] Legislature, the right to enact 
laws in regard to the manner in which arms shall be borne.”234 Rather, the 
state’s constitutional text left “the Legislature the authority to adopt such 
regulations of police, as may be dictated by the safety of the people and the 
advancement of public morals.”235 As long as an Alabamian remained 
capable of carrying a weapon in public for self-defense, such a concealed 
carry ban was permissible.236 Yet, the court made sure to note that “[a] statute 
which, under the pretence of regulating, amounts to a destruction of the right 
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[to bear arms], or which requires arms to be so borne as to render them wholly 
useless for the purpose of defence, would be clearly unconstitutional.”237 
Thus, Reid allowed for a substantial amount of regulation of the right to bear 
arms, but firmly recognized that that right extended to the public arena for 
self-defense.  
 Six years later, the Georgia Supreme Court ruled firmly in favor of an 
individual right to carry arms openly.238 In Nunn v. State, the court struck 
down a Georgia law that banned “wearing or carrying” any weapons, 
including pistols.239 As Georgia’s constitution did not include a provision 
granting the right to bear arms, Nunn directly interpreted the Second 
Amendment. Beginning with a clear statement of the constitutional 
guarantee, which the Heller court would quote in full over a century and a 
half later, the court clarified: 
The right of the whole people, old and young, men, women 
and boys, and not militia only, to keep and bear arms of every 
description, and not such merely as are used by the militia, 
shall not be infringed, curtailed, or broken in upon, in the 
smallest degree . . . .240  
The Second Amendment, the court concluded, protected the “natural right of 
self-defence.”241 Since Georgia’s law prohibited “bearing arms openly,” i.e., 
carrying firearms in public, it impermissibly abridged that right.242 Of note, 
Nunn’s interpretation of the Second Amendment is particularly persuasive, 
because, as Heller mentions, “[i]ts opinion perfectly captured the way in 
which the operative clause of the Second Amendment furthers the purpose 
announced in the prefatory clause . . . .”243  
 The holding in Nunn was affirmed a few years later in State v. 
Chandler,244 in which the Louisiana Supreme Court likewise upheld a 
concealed carry ban as consistent with the Second Amendment. In 
Chandler, the defendant was convicted of manslaughter after the judge 
refused to instruct the jury “that to carry weapons, either concealed or 
openly, is not a crime in the State of Louisiana; that the Constitution which 
guarantees to the citizen the right to bear arms cannot be restricted by the 
 
237 Id. at 616–17. 
238 Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243 (1846) (cited in Heller, 554 U.S. at 612, 626, 629). 
239 Id. at 246. 
240 Id. at 251 (emphasis omitted). 
241 Id.  
242 Id.  
243 554 U.S. 570, 612 (2008); see also O’Shea, supra note 135, at 627 (“No case, historic or 
recent, is discussed more prominently or positively in Heller than the Georgia Supreme 
Court’s 1846 decision in Nunn v. State.”). 
244 5 La. Ann. 489 (1850) (cited in Heller, 554 U.S. at 613, 626). 





action of the Legislature.”245 Considering this instruction on appeal, the 
court noted approvingly of Louisiana’s concealed carry ban , holding that 
it was permissible under the Second Amendment.246 This was because the 
law did not restrict “a man’s right to carry arms . . . ‘in full open view,’” 
for the purpose of self-defense, which the court pronounced as “the right 
guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States.”247 
Finally, the Supreme Court’s decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford 248—
shameful in its conclusion that African Americans could not claim U.S. 
citizenship—inadvertently supported the proposition that the Constitution 
guaranteed the right to carry firearms in public for self-defense. Writing for 
the majority, Chief Justice Taney, both racist and flawed in his analysis, 
reasoned that because black people could not be citizens, Scott could not 
sue in an Article III court.249 The Court came to this conclusion, in part, 
by what it saw as a “reductio ad absurdum argument: it enumerated 
several important ‘privileges and immunities’ enjoyed by American 
citizens, and argued that it would be inconceivable that blacks would enjoy 
such liberties; therefore, blacks could not be citizens.”250 These privileges 
and immunities that black people would possess if granted citizenship 
included, inter alia, the right “to keep and carry arms wherever they went,” 
demonstrating an understanding of the Second Amendment that protected 
public carriage. 251  
Of course, not all antebellum caselaw explicitly affirmed the right to 
carry firearms in public for self-defense. In fact, quite a few opinions reject 
this claim, upholding severe restrictions on carrying weapons in public.252 
 
245 Id. at 489. 
246 Id. at 490. 
247 Id. at 489–90. 
248 See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (describing which people qualify as citizens 
and the constitutional rights and protections that are afforded to them). 
249 Id. at 407. 
250 O’Shea, supra note 135, at 630.  
251 Scott, 60 U.S. at 417. 
252 See State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18 (1842) (upholding an Arkansas ban on the concealed carry 
of dangerous weapons, such as pistols); Hill v. State, 53 Ga. 472, 474 (1874) (upholding law 
preventing anyone from carrying “deadly weapon[s] to any court of justice or any election 
ground or precinct, or any place of public worship, or any other public gathering . . . except 
militia muster grounds.”); English v. State, 35 Tex. 473, 473 (1871) (holding that Texas 
statute “prohibiting the carrying of pistols, dirks, and certain other deadly weapons, [was] 
not repugnant to the second amendment to the constitution of the United States”); State v. 
Workman, 35 W. Va. 367, 371 (1891) (upholding state law that prohibited the carrying of 
deadly weapons unless the defendant could show that he was “a quiet and peaceable citizen, 
of good character and standing in the community” and “had good cause to believe . . . that 
 





But critically, most of these contradicted the main holding of Heller: that the 
Second Amendment codified an individual right to bear arms for self-
defense, unconnected with militia participation.253 The state courts’ rejection 
 
he was in danger of death or great bodily harm at the hands of another person”); cf. State v. 
Huntly, 25 N.C. (3 Ired.) 418, 420–22 (1843) (upholding a conviction for “going about armed 
with unusual or dangerous weapons, to the terror of the people,” in part because the North 
Carolina Constitution conferred the right to bear arms only “in defence of the state”); 
Cockrum v. State, 24 Tex. 394, 401–03 (1859) (holding that the Texas constitution—which 
conferred the right to bear arms “in the lawful defense of himself or the state”—protected 
the right to carry a Bowie knife in public for personal self-defense, but allowed the legislature 
to penalize its abuse, as long the regulation did not “deter a citizen from its lawful exercise”). 
Some cases took a more flexible approach, crafting what has been deemed a “hybrid right.” 
O’Shea, supra note 135, at 641–56; see Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 165, 182(1871) 
(reasoning that the “wearing . . . arms may be prohibited if the [state] Legislature deems 
proper, absolutely, at all times, and under all circumstances,” notwithstanding the private 
right to keep arms) (emphasis added); Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 160 (1840) 
(holding that the “legislature may prohibit such manner of wearing as would never be 
resorted to by persons engaged in the common defence”) .  
253 “Although the phrase implies that the carrying of the weapon is for the purpose of 
‘offensive or defensive action,’ it in no way connotes participation in a structured military 
organization.” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 584 (2008); compare id., with 
Buzzard, 4 Ark. at 22 (arguing that the right to bear arms does not “enable each member of 
the community to protect and defend by individual force his private rights against every 
illegal invasion”); Hill, 53 Ga. at 476 (“The right to bear arms [is granted so] that the state 
may, when its exigencies demand, have at call a body of men, having arms at their command, 
belonging to themselves and habituated to the use of them, [yet] is in no fair sense a guarantee 
that the owners of these arms may bear them at concerts, and prayer-meetings, and 
elections.”); Huntly, 25 N.C. (3 Ired.) at 418 (“While it secures to him a right of which he 
cannot be deprived, it holds forth the duty in execution of which that right is to be exercised. 
If he employ those arms, which he ought to wield for the safety and protection of his country, 
to the annoyance and terror and danger of its citizens, he deserves but the severer 
condemnation for the abuse of the high privilege, with which he has been invested.”); 
Andrews, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) at 177–78 (“What was the object held to be so desirable as to 
require that its attainment should be guaranteed by being inserted in the fundamental law of 
the land? It was the efficiency of the people as soldiers, when called into actual service for 
the security of the State, as one end . . . .”); Aymette, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) at 156 (interpreting 
the Tennessee constitution’s provision guaranteeing “free white men [the] . . . right to keep 
and bear arms for their common defence” as primarily a collective and public, rather than 
individual and private, right); English, 35 Tex. at 474–77 (holding that the Second 
Amendment protected keeping and bearing only those arms that are “useful and proper to an 
armed militia,” but not “deadly weapons” such as pistols and bowie knives); Cockrum, 24 
Tex. at 401–03 (noting that the objective of the Second Amendment is “the perpetuation of 
free government, and is based on the idea, that the people cannot be effectually oppressed 
and enslaved, who are not first disarmed;” and distinguishing the Second Amendment from 
the Texas right-to-arms provision, which “has the same broad object in relation to the 
government, and in addition thereto, secures a personal right to the citizen.”); Workman, 35 
W.Va. at 371 (holding that the Second Amendment was a “popular right” that protected 
 





of that understanding underlays their conclusions that the right to bear arms 
did not encompass a strong right to carry firearms in public. “[W]ith Heller 
on the books,” such cases “furnish us with little instructive value”254 in 
determining whether the individual right to bear arms in self-defense 
protected by the Second Amendment confers a right to public carriage.  
If those opinions that conceive of the right to bear arms as rooted in a 
militia service are excluded, there remain only two nineteenth century cases 
that tolerated state regulation of open carry akin to today’s “special need” 
laws.255 The first, State v. Duke,256 involved a law not unlike today’s “special 
need” regulations. Texas prohibited individuals from carrying weapons in 
public—thus excluding personal property and place of business—unless they 
had “reasonable grounds for fearing an unlawful attack on his person, and . . . 
such ground of attack shall be immediate and pressing.”257 The Texas Supreme 
Court ultimately upheld the statute as valid under the Texas constitution, 
concluding that the regulation on “where, and the circumstances under which, 
a pistol may be carried . . . respected the right to carry . . . openly when needed 
for self-defense.”258 As the Young court pointed out, however, “[o]ne need only 
take a peek at the Texas constitutional provision that served as the basis for the 
court’s decision” to fully comprehend the Texas Supreme Court’s rationale: 
the Texas constitution’s right-to-arms provision provided that “[e]very person 
shall have the right to keep and bear arms in the lawful defense of himself or 
the State, under such regulations as the Legislature may prescribe.”259 This 
“restrictive proviso”260 is obviously not present in the Second Amendment; its 
“very substance,” therefore, while “surely tolerat[ing] some degree of 
regulation . . . is not so explicitly limited by such a regulatory caveat.”261 
Unlike Duke, the second case, Walburn v. Territory, directly 
interpreted the Second Amendment. In that case, the Supreme Court of the 
Territory of Oklahoma held that a state law banning all public carriage: 
“violates none of the inhibitions of the constitution of the United States, and 
 
“public liberty” through the use of “weapons of warfare to be used by the militia,” but not 
“other weapons as are usually employed in” acts of public violence).  
254 Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044, 1057 (9th Cir. 2018).  
255 Id.  at 1058 (citing State v. Duke, 42 Tex. 455 (1874); Walburn v. Territory, 59 P. 972 
(Okla. Terr. 1899)).  
256 42 Tex. 455 (1874).  
257 Id. at 456. The court construed that exception as applying to “any one having reasonable 
grounds to fear an attack.” Id. at 460. 
258 Id. at 459.  
259 Young, 896 F.3d at 1058 (citing Duke, 42 Tex. at 458).  
260 O’Shea, supra note 135, at 655. 
261 Young, 896 F.3d at 1058. The court then added: “We shouldn’t pencil one in.” Id. 





that its provisions are within the police power of the territory.”262 Despite this 
bold conclusion, the court appeared to water down its holding, noting that, 
the defendant asserted that “the law under which he was convicted is in 
conflict with the constitution of the United States,” but “[n]o authorities are 
cited in support of this position, nor is the proposition very earnestly 
urged.”263 It is unwise to give much credence to this short opinion, especially 
in light of its explicit acknowledgment that the holding was not thoroughly 
argued and considered.  
 
2. Modern Caselaw on the Right to Bear Arms 
 
We turn next to twenty-first century caselaw. The touchstone of 
Heller is self-defense. The opinion makes clear that the ability to defend 
oneself—especially in, but not strictly confined to, the home—is at the heart 
of the Second Amendment’s protections.264 As explained in the textual 
analysis above,265 Heller concluded that the meaning of “bear arms” is to 
“carry [weapons] . . .  for the purpose . . . of being armed and ready . . . in a 
case of conflict with another person.”266 Thus, the aim of self-defense is 
inherent in the very act of bearing arms.  
Moreover, the historical language cited in Heller for the proposition that 
the Second Amendment’s protections include an individual right to keep and 
bear arms also compels the conclusion that it includes a public exercise of that 
right. St. George Tucker’s emphasis on the importance of self-defense, cited 
throughout the opinion, supports an individual-rights interpretation of the 
Second Amendment, yes, but suggests a right to carry in public, too.267 Heller’s 
 
262 59 P. 972, 973 (Okla. Terr. 1899). 
263 Id. at 972. 
264 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 630 (2008) (describing the “core lawful 
purpose of self-defense”).  
265 Supra Section II.A.  
266 Heller, 554 U.S. at 584 (citing Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 139 (1998) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting)). 
267 As the Heller Court explained, 
St. George Tucker’s version of Blackstone’s Commentaries . . . conceived 
of the Blackstonian arms right as necessary for self-defense. He equated 
that right . . . with the Second Amendment . . . Tucker elaborated on the 
Second Amendment: “This may be considered as the true palladium of 
liberty . . . The right to self defence is the first law of nature.” 
Id. at 606 (citing TUCKER, supra note 144). The Court claimed that the Framers understood 
the Second Amendment as granting “the right to enable individuals to defend themselves,” 
citing Tucker in support: Tucker “made clear . . . [that] Americans understood the ‘right of 
self-preservation’ as permitting a citizen to ‘repe[l] force by force’ when ‘the intervention of 
 





reference to Charles Sumner’s 1856 speech about Bleeding Kansas268 likewise 
requires an outside-the-home understanding of the Second Amendment. In his 
comments, Sumner describes a “rifle” as the “tutelary protector against the red 
man and the beast of the forest,” the use of which was guaranteed by “at least 
one article in our National Constitution.”269 It is difficult to believe “that either 
Senator Sumner or Justice Scalia imagined the frontiersman encountering ‘the 
red man’ or ‘the beast of the forest’ . . . only in his home.”270  
Certain circuit courts’ emphasis on the home is especially puzzling in 
light of Heller’s explicit language elevating self-defense as the core Second 
Amendment right. The majority criticized as “profoundly mistaken” Justice 
Breyer’s argument, in dissent, that the “individual self-defense is merely a 
‘subsidiary interest’ of the right to keep and bear arms.”271 To the contrary, 
the majority clarified, “self-defense . . . was the central component of the 
right itself.”272 It is worth noting that the word “home” does not appear in that 
description of the right’s “central component.”273  
The centrality of self-defense was affirmed by the same Court nearly 
two years later in McDonald,274 the first sentence of which states that “[t]wo 
years ago, in District of Columbia v. Heller, . . . we held that the Second 
 
society in his behalf, may be too late to prevent an injury.’” Id. at 594–95 (quoting TUCKER, 
supra note 144, at 145–46 n.42). 
268 “Bleeding Kansas” refers to an era of violence in the mid-1800s as pro- and anti-
slavery factions fought to control Kansas. See, e.g., Bleeding Kansas, NAT’L PARK SERV., 
https://www.nps.gov/fosc/learn/historyculture/bleeding.htm [https://perma.cc/YUG6-
2JGV] (last updated Apr. 23, 2020). 
269 Id. at 609 (quoting Charles Sumner, The Crime Against Kansas, in AMERICAN 
SPEECHES: POLITICAL ORATORY FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 553, 606–07 
(Ted Widmer ed. 2006)).  
270 Michael C. Dorf, Does Heller Protect a Right to Carry Guns Outside the Home?, 59 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 225, 227 (2008). 
271 Heller, 554 U.S. at 599. 
272 Id.  
273 In addition to the general use of the phrase “self-defense” throughout the opinion, it’s 
worth mentioning that the longstanding regulations mentioned in Heller as “presumptively 
lawful” include “laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools 
and government buildings.” Id. at 626. If the Second Amendment did not protect the right to 
carry firearms in public in the first place, there would be no need clarify the legality of such 
prohibitions.  
274 McDonald concerned another handgun ban, this time by the city of Chicago, Illinois. 
Since Chicago’s law was identical to the District of Columbia regulation struck down in 
Heller, the sole question was whether the individual right to keep and bear arms was 
incorporated against state and local governments via the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
Supreme Court found that it was both “fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty” and 
“deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,” and thus must apply equally to the 
federal government and the states. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010) 
(citations omitted). 





Amendment protects the right to keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-
defense . . . .”275 Thus, the same Court that issued Heller later interpreted that 
opinion as defining the core of the Second Amendment to protect the use of 
firearms in self-defense.276 Although the significance of the home is 
mentioned throughout the opinion, it is the general right of self-defense277  
that dominates the Court’s reasoning in concluding that the Second 
Amendment is “fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty.”278  
 Heller’s and McDonald’s repeated references to the home do not 
imply a restricted construal of the Second Amendment’s core protections, 
which abruptly cease the moment one steps out the door; rather, these 
mentions are merely a function of the laws that were challenged before the 
Court. Both cases involved laws which, inter alia, banned handguns in the 
home.279  The appellant in Heller challenged only his right to use a handgun 
at home for self-defense, not the capacity to do so in public.280 In actuality, 
the right recognized in Heller and McDonald was much broader—protecting 
the right to keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-defense, regardless of 
where that need arises.  
 
D. Structural Argument 
 
In response to the rather clear conclusions that follow from textual 
and historical analyses of the Second Amendment, some structural arguments 
have been made to claim that the core right recognized in Heller is limited to 
self-defense in the home by analogizing to the sacred place of the home found 
in other Constitutional guarantees. As the Second Circuit noted, “[t]reating 
 
275 Id. at 749–50.  
276 See id. at 767 (“[I]n Heller, we held that individual self-defense is ‘the central component’ 
of the Second Amendment right.”). 
277 See id. (“Self-defense is a basic right, recognized by many legal systems from ancient 
times to the present day . . . .”). 
278 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
279 See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 750 (“[Petitioners] are Chicago residents who would like to 
keep handguns in their homes for self-defense but are prohibited from doing so by Chicago's 
firearms laws.”); Heller, 554 U.S. at 575 (“[Respondent] applied for a registration certificate 
for a handgun that he wished to keep at home, but the District refused.”). 
280 In Heller, the appellant 
filed a lawsuit in the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia 
seeking, on Second Amendment grounds, to enjoin the city from enforcing 
the bar on the registration of handguns, the licensing requirement insofar 
as it prohibits the carrying of a firearm in the home without a license, and 
the trigger-lock requirement insofar as it prohibits the use of ‘functional 
firearms within the home. 
 554 U.S. at 575–76. 





the home as special and subject to limited state regulation is not unique to 
firearm regulation; it permeates individual rights jurisprudence.”281 Rather, 
the “privilege of the home works a kind of alchemy with the Constitution.”282  
 The Bill of Rights explicitly mentions the home in two places—the 
Third and Fourth Amendments. The home is therefore given sacrosanct status 
in cases involving unreasonable searches and seizures.283 Yet, importantly, 
structural proponents point out that the Constitution need not say the magic 
word for the Supreme Court to recognize the implicit protection of the home. 
Like the Second Amendment, nothing in the language of the First 
Amendment suggests that its guarantees should have a more superior force 
inside the home than outside it. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has found 
that the Bill of Rights as a whole supports this proposition. In Stanley v. 
Georgia, for example, the Supreme Court held that the right to process 
information and ideas “takes on an added dimension” when considered “in 
the privacy of a person’s own home.”284  Thus, the States could not 
criminalize the possession of obscenity in the home.285 Similarly, 
in Lawrence v. Texas, the Court noted that State efforts to regulate private 
sexual conduct is particularly suspect when it intrudes into the home: 
“Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions into 
a dwelling or other private places. In our tradition the State is not 
omnipresent in the home.”286  
In these First Amendment cases, the home is the clear dividing line 
between permissible and impermissible government intervention. After 
Stanley, States retained the authority to ban obscenity in the public domain; 
likewise, “[Lawrence] le[ft] undisturbed the states’ authority to prohibit 
 
281 Kachalsky v. Cty. Of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 94 (2d Cir. 2012); see also Gould v. 
Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 672 (1st Cir. 2018) (“This sort of differentiation is not unique to 
Second Amendment rights. Many constitutional rights are virtually unfettered inside the 
home but become subject to reasonable regulation outside the home.” (citations omitted)). 
282 Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second Amendment, 109 
COLUM. L. REV. 1278, 1305 (2009).  
283 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (“‘At the very core’ of the Fourth 
Amendment ‘stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from 
unreasonable governmental intrusion.”’ (citation omitted)); see also id. at 37 (“In the home, 
our [Fourth Amendment] cases show [that] the entire area is held safe from prying 
government eyes.”).  
284 394 U.S. 557, 564–65 (1969). 
285 Id. at 568. 
286 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003); see generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479 (1965) (deriving a general right to privacy from the penumbras of several rights 
enumerated in the Bill of Rights, which protected the “sensitive area of privacy of the home”). 





sexual conduct that occurs in a public—rather than private—arena.”287 This 
private versus public distinction has led some scholars to advocate for 
treating the “Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms for self-defense 
the same as the right to own and view adult obscenity under the First 
Amendment—a robust right in the home, subject to near-plenary restriction 
by elected government everywhere else.”288 Just as the right to view obscenity 
or engage in sex in one’s own home does not entitle her to take either of these 
intimate behaviors outside, nor does the right to use a gun to defend hearth and 
home entail a right to carry firearms in public, the argument goes. 
Importing the hallowed status of the home from First Amendment 
and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence into the Second Amendment arena 
is not a novel idea.289 In fact, Heller can be viewed as readying this private 
versus public distinction in the context of firearms. Given how frequently 
the opinion mentions the word (seventy-three times, by my count), it is at 
least plausible to suggest that the home is the touchstone of gun rights.290  
 Furthermore, the analogy makes intuitive sense: like obscenity and 
sex, in fact even more-so, guns are considered harmful to others. This 
threat underlies the private versus public distinction: “obscenity and 
sexual activity lose their protected status in public because they cause 
harm in public—they offend the sensibilities of others, including minors—
that they do not cause in private.”291 The same argument applies for 
 
287 Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565 (“Whatever may be the justifications for other statutes 
regulating obscenity, we do not think they reach into the privacy of one’s own home.”); 
Miller, supra note 282, at 1305 n.185 (citing Singson v. Commonwealth, 621 S.E.2d 682, 
687–88 (Va. Ct. App. 2005) (upholding conviction for solicitation of sodomy)); see also 
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 213 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“Intimate 
behavior may be punished when it takes place in public.”); State v. Thomas, 891 So. 2d 
1233, 1236 (La. 2005) (upholding conviction for solicitation of “unnatural oral copulation” 
because “Lawrence specifically states the [C]ourt's decision does not disturb state statutes 
prohibiting public sexual conduct or prostitution”). 
288 Miller, supra note 282, at 1278. 
289 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580–82 (2008) (referencing the 
First Amendment protection provided to modern media to demonstrate that the Second 
Amendment should extend to modern weaponry); id. at 591 (noting that both the First and 
Second Amendment use the singular “right” to protect multiple rights); id. at 595 (asserting 
that early limits on weapons possession do not undermine the Court's interpretation of the 
Second Amendment, since there were limits on the First Amendment at the Founding, 
too); id. at 625–26 (pointing out that the first Supreme Court case to strike down a law as 
violative of the First Amendment was issued almost 150 years after its ratification); id. at 
634–35 (asserting that the Second Amendment, like the First Amendment, does not tolerate 
interest-balancing and is subject to historical exceptions).  
290 See id. at 628 (criticizing the law for prohibiting the possession of firearms in “the home, 
where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute.”). 
291 Dorf, supra note 270, at 232–33. 





firearms. Guns carried and used in public pose an inherent danger to others 
that they do not present when kept in the home, where they can harm only 
the inhabitants or intruders.292 Finally, gut instinct supports the private 
versus public distinction: “the notion of D.C. residents walking the streets, 
including the streets just beyond the Supreme Court grounds, with visible 
sidearms, could well be upsetting to the Justices in a way and to a degree 
that Mr. Heller’s night-table handgun was not.”293 
Yet, there are several foundational problems with translating the unique 
constitutional dispensation of the home into the Second Amendment arena. 
Viewing obscene materials and engaging in same-sex intercourse within one’s 
home is protected because that is a private space. As the Court expounded in 
Griswold v. Connecticut, “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have 
penumbras,” one of which is privacy.294 But privacy is not the value 
undergirding the use of firearms in the house; rather, guns are used for safety and 
protection. That difference collapses the First Amendment analogy. As Judge 
Posner wryly put it: “the interest in having sex inside one’s home is much greater 
than the interest in having sex on the sidewalk in front of one’s home. But the 
interest in self-protection is as great outside as inside the home.”295  
 
E. Prudential Considerations 
 
Prudential considerations have also been raised to suggest that the 
public carriage of guns may fall outside the core protections of the Second 
Amendment.296 As already explained, whereas using a gun within the confines 
 
292 But Dorf states that 
as a strictly doctrinal matter, the analogy between Heller and Stanley 
remains strong because in fact, the doctrinal distinction between home 
possession and public possession of obscenity does not turn on the 
ostensible harm that obscenity does outside the home. If it did, then there 
would be a First Amendment right to carry obscene materials in public, so 
long as they were concealed. Yet the Supreme Court has clearly rejected 
this extension of Stanley, a case now best understood as protecting the 
privacy of the home against excessive government snooping. We can make 
the most sense of Stanley as a case in which the Court invoked values 
marked by the text of the Fourth Amendment to inform its understanding 
of the First Amendment. 
Id. at 233. 
293 Id. For more support for the “home-bound” approach to the Second Amendment, see 
Miller, supra note 282, at 1279 (noting, inter alia, the method’s “benefit of simplicity”). 
294 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). 
295 Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 941 (7th Cir. 2012). 
296 See, e.g., Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 671 (1st Cir. 2018) (“Societal 
considerations also suggest that the public carriage of firearms, even for the purpose of self-
defense, should be regarded as falling outside the core of the Second Amendment right.”). 





of one’s home threatens only the residents (plus any unwelcome intruders), the 
same cannot be said for use outside the home, where countless innocent 
bystanders could fall victim to one’s weaponry.297 But there are additional 
societal reasons to differentiate the inside and outside the home.  
For one, we are most vulnerable inside the home. It is a “high-value 
target,” where our nearest and dearest live, keep their most prized 
possessions (whether measured in monetary or sentimental value), and let 
down their guard (particularly while sleeping at night).298 Conversely, we are 
more protected outside the home. In public, society provides protections which 
are not present in private. As the First Circuit summarized: 
Outside the home, society typically relies on police officers, 
security guards, and the watchful eyes of concerned citizens to 
mitigate threats. This same panoply of protections is much less 
effective inside the home. Police may not be able to respond to 
calls for help quickly, so an individual within the four walls of 
his own house may need to provide for the protection of himself 
and his family in case of emergency. 299  
With these disparities in mind, the need for—and thus presumably the right 
to—self-defense seems at its zenith inside the home, yet more constrained 
outside of it.  
 Yet there are valid counterarguments to each of these pragmatic 
assertions. Although firearms pose a threat to more people when they are 
carried in public, as Judge Posner posited, “there is also a possibility that 
criminals will be more timid with the knowledge that law-abiding citizens 
may be carrying a gun.”300 Add to that suggestion the NRA’s favorite 
slogan—the only thing that stops a bad guy with a gun, is a good guy with a 
 
297 See United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 470 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[O]utside the 
home, firearm rights have always been more limited, because public safety interests often 
outweigh individual interests in self-defense.”). These truths are especially evident in densely 
populated urban areas like Boston and Brookline. See Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 
123 YALE L.J. 82, 108 (2013) (explaining that “American cities have traditionally had much 
more stringent gun control than rural areas”). 
298 O’Shea, supra note 135, at 611. “More than sixty percent of home invasion[s], or ‘hot,’ 
burglaries (that is, those that occur when the home’s occupants are present) occur at night, 
when potential victims are likely to be asleep or otherwise unwary, which makes these 
intrusions especially dangerous.” Id. at 612.  
299 Gould, 907 F.3d at 671–72. It is worth noting that organized police forces did not exist at 
the Founding. Citizens protected themselves, their homes, and their families, and served as 
police officers for their neighbors. Brian Enright, The Constitutional “Terra Incognita” of 
Discretionary Concealed Carry Laws, 2 U. ILL. L. REV. 909, 932 (2015) (citations omitted). 
300 Kevin Behne, Packing Heat: Judicial Review of Concealed Carry Laws Under the Second 
Amendment, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 1347, 1366 (2016) (citing Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 
937 (7th Cir. 2012)). 





gun301—and there exists at least some ground for a court sympathetic towards 
gun rights to doubt the contention that the public carriage of firearms poses 
an increased threat to others.  
 The notion that we are most vulnerable inside of our homes is likewise 
pervious.302 To begin with, most violent crimes occur outside the home, 
making it a “critical zone for armed self-defense.”303 It is not difficult to 
imagine a scenario in which one would feel safer within the fortress of one’s 
home than outside on the street. Heller “conjures the image of the homeowner 
needing to reach for the handgun in her night table to stop the rapist climbing 
through the window,” but it is just as easy to envision a “late-shift worker 
walking home through a deserted alley in the wee hours of the morning.”304 
Parallel situations abound: 
A woman who is being stalked or has obtained a protective order 
against a violent ex-husband is more vulnerable to being attacked 
while walking to or from her home than when inside. She has a 
stronger self-defense claim to be allowed to carry a gun in public 
than the resident of a fancy apartment building (complete with 
doorman) has a claim to sleep with a loaded gun under her 
mattress.305  
To reference again the sardonic reasoning of Judge Posner: “a Chicagoan is a 
good deal more likely to be attacked on a sidewalk in a rough neighborhood than 
in his apartment on the 35th floor of the Park Tower.”306  
 
III. IDENTIFICATION AND APPLICATION FOR MEANS-END SCRUTINY 
 
The majority of circuit court opinions are unhelpful regarding the 
proper selection of means-end scrutiny, having applied intermediate 
scrutiny only after determining that “special need” regulations do not 
burden a core Second Amendment right. Having determined that “special 
 
301 FreedomsLighthouse, NRA Director: “The Only Thing that Stops a Bad Guy with a Gun 
is a Good Guy with a Gun,” YOUTUBE (Dec. 21, 2012), https://youtu.be/UjrdDAcaQq0 
[https://perma.cc/BP5C-JQZV].   
302 See Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044, 1052 (9th Cir. 2018) (“The prospect of 
confrontation is . . . not limited to one’s dwelling.”); Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 
F.3d 650, 657 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“After all, the Amendment’s ‘core lawful purpose’ is self-
defense, and the need for that might arise beyond as well as within the home.” (citation 
omitted)); Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 941 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he interest in self-
protection is as great outside as inside the home.”).  
303 O’Shea, supra note 135, at 612. 
304 Dorf, supra note 270, at 229 (citations omitted). 
305 Moore, 702 F.3d at 937. 
306 Id. 





need” laws do in fact burden a core Second Amendment right, it is therefore 
essential to identify the appropriate means-end scrutiny to evaluate the 
constitutionality of this burden.  
 
A. What Is the Appropriate Means–End Scrutiny to Apply? 
 
It is not always the case that laws burdening the core of a right 
demand strict scrutiny.307 However, I argue that “special need” laws do, in 
fact, warrant application of strict scrutiny. A useful analogy is voting laws, 
which implicate another constitutional guarantee under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. A total ban is a law that says no one can vote. That is clearly 
unconstitutional. Instead, imagine a law that prohibits someone from voting 
unless she satisfies some criterion that is not necessarily feasible or within 
her control. The law might prohibit anyone from voting who, for instance, 
lacks property or children.308 That law would receive strict scrutiny.309 
Contrast the criteria in those cases with voting conditions that everyone 
could (in theory) satisfy, such as the identification requirements in voter ID 
laws.310 As such, those laws typically receive lesser scrutiny.311 The “special 
need” requirement resembles neither the first nor third category, but rather 
the second. In other words, “special need” laws do not constitute total 
bans;312 nor do they operate like voter ID laws. Rather, they act in the 
Second Amendment setting like property or child custody qualifications do 
in the voting context. Like the condition that individuals own property or 
have children in order to vote, the requirement that an applicant demonstrate 
a “special need” for self-defense is intended to screen out most people from 
exercising the right at issue. Unlike voter identification, it is not a 
prerequisite that everyone (in theory) ought to be able to meet if they simply 
put in the effort. Analogizing to voting jurisprudence thus confirms that 
 
307 Circuit courts appear to assume without question this binary “if/then” relationship 
between noncore versus core rights, and the application of intermediate versus strict 
scrutiny, respectively. See supra notes 67–73 and accompanying text (describing the 
different levels of scrutiny and when they are applied). 
308 See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 622 (1969) (reviewing a New 
York law that limited school board voting rights based on those two criteria).  
309 Id. at 627 (“[T]he Court must determine whether the exclusions are necessary to promote 
a compelling state interest.”).  
310 Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 198 (2008) (“For most voters who 
need them, the inconvenience of making a trip to the BMV, gathering the required 
documents, and posing for a photograph surely does not qualify as a substantial burden on 
the right to vote, or even represent a significant increase over the usual burdens of voting.”). 
311 Id. at 189–91 (articulating a “balancing approach” to weigh “relevant and legitimate state 
interests” against burden on voters).  
312 For my critique of this approach, see supra Subsection I.B.iii.  





“special need” laws, which burden a core Second Amendment right, should 
receive strict scrutiny.  
 
B. Does the Law Survive Application of Strict Scrutiny? 
 
The final question is whether “special need” laws survive strict 
scrutiny. Strict scrutiny, the highest standard of review that a court applies 
to evaluate the constitutionality of a regulation, demands that a law be 
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.313 The 
government need not demonstrate this relationship to a scientifically certain 
degree; a common-sense intuition is often sufficient.314 Less legislative 
deference is allowed under strict scrutiny than under rational basis review 
or intermediate scrutiny, but some deference is granted to the government’s 
narrow tailoring conclusion.315 Although the argument is a difficult one, I 
believe that these regulations do satisfy strict scrutiny.  
 
1. Compelling Interest 
 
The governmental interest of protecting public safety and preventing 
crime (particularly violent crime committed with handguns), is indisputably 
compelling.316 
 
313 See supra note 68. 
314 See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (plurality opinion) (considering 
“long history, a substantial consensus, and simple common sense” to determine whether a 
law survives strict scrutiny).  
315 See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 33-34 (2010) (deferring, 
while applying strict scrutiny, to the government’s judgments on national security and 
foreign affairs). In Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court was similarly deferential despite 
applying strict scrutiny: 
The Law School’s assessment that diversity will, in fact, yield educational 
benefits is substantiated by respondents and their amici. Our scrutiny of the 
interest asserted by the Law School is no less strict for taking into account 
complex educational judgments in an area that lies primarily within the expertise 
of the university. Our holding today is in keeping with our tradition of giving a 
degree of deference to a university’s academic decisions, within constitutionally 
prescribed limits. 
539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).  
316 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 749-50 (1987) (describing “the government’s 
interest in preventing crime” as “compelling”); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264 (1984) 
(“The ‘legitimate and compelling state interest’ in protecting the community from crime cannot 
be doubted.” (quoting De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 155 (1960))); see also, e.g., Gould 
v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 673 (1st Cir. 2018) (“It cannot be gainsaid that Massachusetts has 
compelling governmental interests in both public safety and crime prevention.”); Woollard v. 
 





2. Narrow Tailoring  
 
The tougher sell is narrow tailoring. From an empirical standpoint, 
the relationship between “special need” regulations and firearm violence has 
not been studied extensively; the extent to which self-defense firearm use 
would be required among those who would fail to demonstrate that need in 
“special need” licensing regimes remains unclear. Preliminary research, 
however, shows that the general need to use guns for the purpose of self-
defense is overestimated, suggesting that “special need” regulations would 
affect an extremely narrow slice of the population.317  
In the absence of available empirical evidence, intuition, logic, and 
common sense are worth investigating. On the one hand, the special need 
requirement may appear on its face to be overbroad, given the harm it is 
designed to avert (gun violence). This is because, of those who would choose 
to carry firearms in public, plenty would not use them to harm others. But, 
it’s important to remember that the right to bear arms does not simply protect 
the literal carrying around of a weapon at any time, to any place, for any 
reason; it protects the right to carry a firearm for the purpose of self-
defense.318 In other words, the firearm is the vessel by which the right of self-
defense is executed. Put another way, carrying the firearm itself is not in and 
of itself the right; the Constitution offers that protection only to serve the 
purpose of, or to promote, the core right—the right of self-defense.319 
 
Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 877 (4th Cir. 2013) (“Appellees concede that ‘a compelling 
government interest in public safety’ generally exists . . . .”); Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 
701 F.3d 81, 97 (2d Cir. 2012) (“As the parties agree, New York has substantial, indeed 
compelling, governmental interests in public safety and crime prevention.”). 
317 See, e.g., David Hemenway & Sara J. Solnick, The Epidemiology of Self-Defense Gun 
Use: Evidence from the National Crime Victimization Surveys 2007–2011, 79 PREVENTIVE 
MED. 22, 23-24 (2015) (finding that self-defense gun use occurs in fewer than one percent 
of contact crimes).  
318 Compare, e.g., Heller, 554 U.S. at 616 (“It was plainly the understanding in the post-Civil 
War Congress that the Second Amendment protected an individual right to use arms for self-
defense.”), and id. at 628 (“[T]he inherent right of self-defense has been central to the Second 
Amendment right.”), and id. at 630 (referring to the Second Amendment’s “core lawful 
purpose of self-defense”), with id. at 626 (explaining that the Second Amendment protection 
is “not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for 
whatever purpose.”).  
319 An analogy to the First Amendment context is once again helpful. There, too, restrictions 
are tolerated on the exercises of the right to freedom of speech that are unlikely to serve the 
relevant purpose. Specifically, the question of whether speech is on a matter of public 
concern is used as a test to determine how much protection it should receive in at least a 
couple of different contexts. For example, if a public employee’s speech is not a matter of 
public concern, it is unlikely to receive much First Amendment protection (even though it 
 





With this narrow construal of the right to bear arms in mind, “special 
need” laws do not seem overbroad after all. To the contrary, they appear 
narrowly tailored, as those who can satisfy the special needs requirement are 
those most likely to exercise the right to self-defense. That’s not to say that 
some gun owners who do ultimately have a need for self-defense in public 
won’t be excluded. The formula set out by “special need” laws will inevitably 
fail to capture those who could not demonstrate the elevated need for self-
defense compared to the general population required to receive an 
unrestricted license, but who nevertheless find themselves in a situation in 
which that need for self-defense does in fact arise. But these exceptions are 
tolerated, even expected, by the relevant caselaw. The Supreme Court has 
stated that strict scrutiny requires only narrow tailoring, not perfect 




The Supreme Court recently heard oral arguments in a case that some 
postulated could have required it to confront the exact scope of the Second 
Amendment’s “core.”322 The Court ultimately avoided assessing the extent 
 
obviously still qualifies as speech). The Court typically excludes it because it is considered 
less valuable—less likely to promote the public’s interest in democratic deliberation and 
informed civic discussion. For example, in Garcetti v. Ceballos, the Court held that there are 
two inquiries to guide interpretation of the constitutional protections 
accorded to public employee speech. The first requires determining 
whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern. If 
the answer is no, the employee has no First Amendment cause of action 
based on his or her employer's reaction to the speech. If the answer is yes, 
then the possibility of a First Amendment claim arises. 
547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006) (citations omitted). There is a similar approach in defamation and 
libel law, where speech on a matter of public concern receives more protection. See 
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1986) (“When the speech is of 
public concern but the plaintiff is a private figure . . . the Constitution . . . supplants the 
standards of the common law . . . .”).  
320 See, e.g., Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 454 (2015) (explaining that the 
Constitution “requires that [a regulation] be narrowly tailored, not that it be ‘perfectly 
tailored.’”) (citation omitted); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 191 (1992) (“A State is not 
required to prove empirically that a[] . . . regulation is perfectly tailored to secure such a 
compelling interest.”).  
321 See, e.g., Williams-Yulee, 575 U.S. at 454 (“The impossibility of perfect tailoring is 
especially apparent when the State’s compelling interest is . . . intangible . . . .”).  
322 See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 883 F.3d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 
2018) (assessing whether New York City’s prohibition on transporting a licensed, locked 
and unloaded handgun to a home or shooting range outside the city limits is permissible 
 





and strength of the Second Amendment’s applicability outside the home, 
concluding that the case was moot.323 Nevertheless, some of the justices may 
wish to “address what some have characterized as consistent 
underenforcement of the Second Amendment in the lower courts.”324 In the 
future, any reasoning that recognizes a Second Amendment right to carry 
firearms outside the home would spell trouble for “special need” laws 
nationwide, undercutting the logic employed by the plurality of circuit courts 
that the right to carry firearms outside the home—even for self-defense—is 
at most a noncore Second Amendment protection.  
Constitutional text, history, structure, and precedent, coupled with 
prudential considerations, suggest that the Second Amendment’s core 
protects the right to carry arms in self-defense outside the home, reasoning 
the Court’s conservative majority is likely to adopt. This will, no doubt, 
trigger a flurry of Second Amendment litigation throughout the lower courts. 
Some courts, heeding Wrenn’s example, may strike down “special need” 
regimes as per se unconstitutional. Others may finally proceed to apply the 
appropriate means-end test, strict scrutiny. In such cases, whether “special 
need” laws will pass constitutional muster depends on whether they can be 
credibly cast as narrowly tailored regulations designed to protect, rather than 
restrict, the right of self-defense for those most likely to exercise it.   
 
under the Second Amendment), cert. granted 139 S. Ct. 939 (2019); see also Brief for 
Appellants at 19, N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 883 F.3d 45 (2d 
Cir. 2015) (No. 15-638) (arguing that New York City’s regulation “burdens the ‘core’ right 
to keep and bear arms for self-defense in the home”); id. at 38 (asserting “no desire to carry 
their handguns on their person in the City.”); Brief for Respondents at 36, N.Y. State Rifle 
& Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 883 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2019) (No. 18-280) (“It would 
make no sense to recognize a generalized right to carry rooted in a right to bear arms outside 
the home where petitioners have never challenged the State’s separate licensing regime that 
regulates carrying handguns in public.”). 
323 See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of N.Y., 140 S. Ct. 1525, 1526-27 (2020). 
After determining that the case was not moot, Justice Alito, in dissent, argued that New 
York’s law was unconstitutional because it burdened the core right recognized in Heller—
“the right to keep a handgun in the home for self-defense,” which included the right “to take 
a gun to a range in order to gain and maintain the skill necessary to use it responsibly.” Id. 
at 1541 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
324 Joe Davis & Nick Reaves, Symposium: So What Exactly Are the Parties Still Fighting 
About in NYSRPA v. City of New York?, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 19, 2019, 1:00 PM), https:// 
www.scotusblog.com/2019/11/symposium-so-what-exactly-are-the-parties-still-fighting-
about-in-nysrpa-v-city-of-new-york/ [https://perma.cc/QGQ9-KHA5]; see also N.Y. State 
Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, 140 S. Ct. at 1527 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“I share Justice Alito’s 
concern that some federal and state courts may not be properly applying Heller and 
McDonald. The Court should address that issue soon, perhaps in one of the several Second 
Amendment cases with petitions for certiorari now pending before the Court.”).  
